Bibliography

This section, periodically broadened and updated, presents a review of bibliographical material on the most important energy-related questions of the 21st century. Last update: August 2008

1 February 2008, by Cristiano Francese
Send this article by mail Send
  • Energy issues in Europe. European Energy security issues, European Energy market, European Union Energy policy, European Union environmental policy, European countries’ Energy policies, EU-Russia energy relations, Oil and gas pipelines in Europe, nuclear energy in Europe, Turkish energy sector, European energy corridors (Turkey).
  • Energy in Russia. Russian energy policy, Russian energy sector, Gazprom, Russian oil and gas network, nuclear energy in Russia.
  • Energy issues in the Caspian. Energy policies of the Caspian states, The Caspian energy network, pipelines in the Caspian region, international oil companies in the Caspian, Russia’s energy relation with Central Asian states.
  • Energy issues in Central Asia. Energy strategies of the Central Asian states, Energy relations with Russia and China, Central Asia oil and gas in the world energy balance.
  • Energy issues in Asia. Chinese energy policy, Russia-China energy relations, Japanese energy policy, energy and the Taiwan issue, strategic pipelines in Asia, Russia energy policy in Asia, Russian Far East, Russia-Japan energy relations.
  • Chinese energy policy
  • Energy issues in Africa. The quest for energy resources in Africa, the Chinese energy policy towards Africa, African energy resources and local politics.
  • Energy market developments. Technology, prices, and world market developments, the role of GNL, world energy prices, forecasts, Energy security issues and concepts.

ENERGY ISSUES IN EUROPE

  • Arentsen, M.J., Dinica, V., Green certificate trading in the Netherlands in the prospect of the European electricity market, in “Energy Policy”, Volume 31, Number 7, June 2003, pp. 609-620(12).

    The support system for green electricity in the Netherlands has been one of the most complex and complicated systems across Europe. A voluntary trade of green certificates—or green labels—was one of the schemes used in the policy models of the 1990s. The liberalization of the electricity market has attracted substantial changes in the degree and nature of commitment by energy companies and political authorities for renewable electricity. In 2001, a new mechanism for the voluntary trade of green certificates has become operational, replacing the green label trade system one terminated in the end of 2000. This paper presents the two systems of green certificates’ trade developed in the Netherlands and discusses their market stimulation potential in the very different economic and industrial circumstances that has surrounded each of them. The paper argues for a need to enable a support system that reduces investment risks as much as possible, and removes the residual, but still strong, institutional, administrative and social barriers for renewables’ deployment. But before this, a clear governmental vision on the role of renewables in current energy supply systems is first needed, backed by a coherent policy and sufficient support along the economic dimension of renewables’ market diffusion.
  • Aune, F.R., Golombek, R., Kittelsen, S.A.C., Rosendahl, K.E., Liberalizing the energy markets of Western Europe - a computable equilibrium model approach, in “Applied Economics”, Volume 36, Number 19, September 20, 2004, pp. 2137-2149(13). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Using a computable equilibrium model, the short-run effects of a radical liberalization of the West European natural gas and electricity markets are examined. In each model country, oil, gas, coal and electricity are produced, traded and consumed. There are world markets for oil and coal, and well-integrated competitive markets for gas and electricity in Western Europe. Gas and electricity are transported and traded across markets under the assumption of ideal third-party access regimes for transportation and limited capacities in the transportation networks. It is found that relative to the data year 1996, radical liberalization reduces the average end-user price of natural gas by around 20%, and the average end-user price of electricity by around 50%. The supply of electricity increases by around 20%, mainly due to increased coal power production. After such liberalization, coal power emerges with the largest market share of electricity production in Western Europe.
  • Axelrod, R.S., The European Energy Charter Treaty. Reality or illusion?, in “Fuel and Energy Abstracts”, Volume 37, Number 5, September 1996, pp. 394-394(1).
  • Axelrod, R.S., Gudipati, M.S., The European Energy Charter Treaty - Reality or illusion?, in “Energy Policy”, Volume 24, Number 6, June 1996, pp. 497-505(9).

    The European Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) initiated by the European Union and signed 17 December 1994, addresses opportunities for investment in energy resource development by Western companies in Eastern Europe and Russia. The overall objective is the transfer of Western technology to the East, providing hard currency and economic security thereby encouraging development of democratic institutions. Basic provisions of the ECT are examined including environmental implications, national sovereignty and exceptions to national treatment, as well as outstanding issues and prospects for success.
  • Bahgat, G., Europe’s energy security: challenges and opportunities, in “International Affairs”, Volume 82, Number 5, September 2006, pp. 961-975(15). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    The extreme volatility of global energy markets since the early 2000s has prompted the Commission of the European Communities to issue a new Green Paper, `A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy’. This important document seeks to identify the main steps EU members need to take to enhance their energy outlooks. The first section in this article discusses the concept `energy security’. This is followed by an examination of Europe’s energy mix (oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables). The third section analyses European efforts to establish and strengthen energy partnerships with Russia, the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East. In other words, the article seeks to examine Europe’s efforts to diversify its energy mix and energy sources. The main argument is that stability and predictability in energy markets are shared goals between producing regions and major consumers.
  • Bacik, G., The Blue Stream Project, Energy Co-operation and Conflicting Interests, in “Turkish Studies”, Volume 2, Number 2, Fall 2001, pp. 85-93(9). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    The case of the Blue Stream Project well illustrates the interplay between energy, regional problems and potential solutions that often generate new disputes. Basically, the Blue Stream Project envisages the transportation of Russian natural gas to Turkey in the context of bilateral agreements in December 1997. According to this plan, 16 billion cubic meters of additional Russian gas would go to Turkey via a pipeline under the Black Sea. The project has faced problems from the start, ranging from technical challenges to political issues, from geopolitical concerns to corruption charges. The article analyzes the discussions over the Blue Stream Project within the context of both Turkish politics and regional energy-oriented relations.
  • Bakis, R., Demirbas, A., Turkey’s Non-fossil Energy Sources and Positive Expectations in the Next Decades, in “Energy Sources”, Volume 27, Number 7, Number 7/May 2005, pp. 613-620(8). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    According to some projections, Turkey’s primary energy demand is expected to increase four times its 1998 value in the next 20 years. Turkish gas demand is expected to increase more than five folds in 2010 and eight times in 2020. Supplies of fossil and nuclear sources are generally acknowledged to be finite; non-fossil energy sources, such as nuclear, hydropower, biomass, solar and wind, are generally considered renewable and therefore sustainable over the relative long term. Turkey plans to increase hydropower production in the near future. The sharp growth of the energy sector has been accompanied by institutional reforms. One of the most important developments has been liberalization of all energy sectors, including electricity production and distribution, to private capital both national and foreign. Turkey possesses a relatively high abundance of hydropower, geothermal energy, biomass, moderate wind speeds and solar radiation, and nuclear energy resources. Renewable environmentally friendly energy must be encouraged, promoted, implemented and demonstrated for use in Turkey.
  • Bakis, R., Demirbas, A., Electricity from Thermal and Hydropower Sources in Turkey: Status and Future Direction, in “Energy Sources”, Volume 26, Number 5, April 2004, pp. 453-461(9). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    In 1995, electricity production reached 86.2 TWh, while in 1971 it was only 8.6 TWh. Electricity production is expected to reach 304 TWh by 2010. The sharp growth of the energy sector has been accompanied by institutional reforms. One of the most important developments has been the liberalization of all energy sectors, including electricity production and distribution, to private capital both national and foreign. Electricity production from biomass has been found to be a promising method in the near future.
  • Belyi, A., New dimensions of energy security of the enlarging EU and their impact on relations with Russia, in “Journal of European Integration”, Volume 25, Number 4, December 2003, pp. 351-369(19). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    This article sets out to evaluate the impact of certain new factors of the EU’s energy security policy on its relations with Russia. Buzan’s approach to security sub-systems is considered, as well as the concept of security as a dynamic political process of ’securisation’. The current changes affect different dimensions of the securisation of EU energy security:
    • The ongoing EU enlargement to countries historically dependent on Russia for their energy supply introduces significant modifications to the EU-Russia relationship;
    • The liberalisation of gas and electricity markets and the consequent creation of the EU single energy market reinforce the EU’s level of energy security;
    • The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the integration of sustainable development affect many concepts of EU energy security.
  • Cherry, J., Cullen, H., Visbeck, M., Small, A., Uvo, C., Impacts of the North Atlantic Oscillation on Scandinavian Hydropower Production and Energy Markets, in “Water Resources Management”, Volume 19, Number 6, December 2005, pp. 673-691(19). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.
    Dramatic swings in the North Atlantic oscillation (NAO) during the 1990s motivated the authors to build a statistical model of NAO impacts on hydropower production and energy markets in Scandinavia. Variation in the NAO index is shown to explain 55% of the variance of streamflow in Norway and up to 30% of the variance in Norway’s hydropower output. It is also possible to identify the influence of NAO anomalies on electricity consumption and prices. Government liberalization allowed a financial market to grow around the international trading of electricity, which in Norway is produced almost entirely from hydropower. The model offers a possible tool for predicting the effects of future NAO movements on hydropower production and energy prices in Scandinavia. The potential influence of skillful climate prediction is discussed.
  • Damme, E.V., Zwart, G., The Liberalized Dutch Green Electricity Market: Lessons from a Policy Experiment, in “De Economist”, Volume 151, Number 4, December 2003, pp. 389-413(25). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    In order to meet the Kyoto targets, in the Netherlands 9% of electricity consumption should be generated from renewable resources by 2010. In this paper, we discuss and comment on the green energy policy the Dutch government adopted in 2001 and 2002 in order to reach this goal, and the new subsidy system that will be in place as of 2003. On the one hand, the policies from the past were successful since they led to 10% of electricity consumption being green in 2001, with a further increase to 13% in 2002. On the other hand, the government argued that the policy was too costly and inefficient. We analyze whether the arguments the Dutch government used to get the new law accepted hold water and we show that mainly the Dutch supply companies benefited from the generous subsidies that the government provided.
  • Demirbas, A., Sahin-Demirbas, A., Demirbas, A.H., Turkey’s Natural Gas, Hydropower, and Geothermal Energy Policies, in “Energy Sources”, Volume 26, Number 3, February 2004, pp. 237-248(12). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    This article deals with Turkey’s natural gas, hydropower, and geothermal energy policies. Turkey has made repeated efforts to increase foreign investment in its power industry. Turkey’s energy demand is growing at 8% a year, one of the highest rates in the world. But investment has lagged far behind what is required to ensure reliable supply. Turkey’s energy use causes serious air pollution problems. Furthermore, the government forecasts strong growth in fossil fuel use, including a four-fold increase in coal use by 2020 that would cause large greenhouse-gas emissions. While the forecasts may overestimate fossil fuel demand growth, the government must address the environmental issues rapidly. Specifically, Turkey needs a strategy that allows it to assume a concrete greenhouse gas emissions target no later than the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Natural gas consumption is the fastest growing primary energy source in Turkey. Turkey has supplied main natural gas needs from Russia; however Turkmen and Iranian gas represent economically sound alternatives. Hydroelectricity accounts for 45% of Turkey’s total installed. Turkey continued, despite strong international criticism, to pursue its plans to construct the 1,200-megawatt Il su hydroelectric project. Il su is part of the Southeastern Anatolian Water Project, known as GAP. When completed, GAP will consist of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. Turkey has a total gross hydropower potential of 433 GW, but only 125 GW of the total hydroelectric potential of Turkey can be economically used. Turkey plans to increase hydropower production in the near future by especially using her small and micro hydroelectric plants (SHEPs and MHPs, respectively). Turkey is one of the geothermally potential rich 7 countries in the world. More than 1,000 hot and mineral water springs up to 373 K and 413 K geothermal fields with a temperature range of 313 to 505 K have been discovered in Turkey. Turkey has shot up the list of top direct use geothermal countries in recent years.
  • Demirbas, A., Turedi, N., Strategic Importance of Natural Gas and Electricity, in “Energy Sources”, Volume 26, Number 14, December 2004, pp. 1379-1388(10). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Turkey is rapidly growing in terms of both its economy and its population. In parallel, its demand for energy, particularly for electricity, is increasing fast. The sharp growth of the Turkish energy sector has been accompanied by institutional reforms. Due to its demographic and economic growth, Turkey constitutes a major energy market. A major dilemma now faced by Turkey is how to invest in new electric power capacity while at the same time adhering to foreign debt ceilings under lending rules set by the IMF. One of the most important developments has been liberalization of all energy sectors, including electricity production and distribution, to private capital both national and foreign.
  • EU worries (again) about Russian energy supplies, in “Oil and Energy Trends”, Volume 32, Number 2, February 2007, pp. 13-14(2).

    The issue of energy security has been thrust back on Europe’s agenda with the interruption to Russian oil exports to central and eastern Europe. The Russians raised their prices to Belarus at the start of the year by imposing an export duty on their crude oil. Belarus retaliated by charging the Russians more to transport their oil through Belarus to countries further west, prompting the Russians to stop supplying Belarus altogether. The whole episode aroused fears across the EU of a repeat of the argument between Russia and Ukraine that led to a shortfall in gas deliveries to western Europe at the beginning of last year (see ’Focus’, January 2006).
  • Hammond, G.P., Stapleton, A.J., Exergy analysis of the United Kingdom energy system, in “Proceedings of the I.MECH.E. (Institution of Mechanical Engineers), Part A, Journal of Power and Energy", Volume 215, Number 2, January 2001, pp. 141-162(22). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    The exergy method has been used to analyse changes in the structure of the UK energy system over a period of more than 30 years from 1965. A sectoral approach was employed, with the supply side examined in terms of the main energy sources, while final demand was separated into four energy end-use groups: the domestic, service, industrial and transport sectors. Estimates of sector-weighted or ’lumped’ parameters, such as exergy efficiencies, were obtained from the particular characteristics of each sector. These were employed to determine the exergetic ’improvement potential’ for critical elements of the energy system. Electricity generation together with final energy demand in the domestic sector and in transport are shown to account for nearly 80 per cent of the Second Law improvement potential. This poor thermodynamic performance is principally due to exergy losses in combustion and heat transfer processes associated with power generation, space heating and main transport modes. The results of the exergy analysis are placed in the context of recent developments in energy market liberalization and of the need to achieve environmental sustainability. They are also contrasted with proposals for new or improved energy technologies to meet the requirements of a sustainable energy strategy. Finally, the role of the exergy method is contrasted with the various other approaches to energy technology assessment.
  • Helm, D., The Assessment: European Networks - Competition, Interconnection, and Regulation->http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi..., in “Oxford Review of Economic Policy”, Volume 17, Number 3, 2001, pp. 297-312(16). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Recent events, such as the California energy crisis, the failures of the UK’s railways, and the consequences of the third-generation (3G) mobile licence auctions, have called into question the European reliance on a strategy of network industry liberalization. Substantial concentration in energy and telecoms markets has also raised the issue of the consistency of competition policy with the creation of internal energy and communications markets. The paper considers the multiple market failures in these industries, and the problems raised by a series of national policy approaches which fail fully to reflect the economies of scale and scope and the European-level public goods. Security of supply in energy, the roll-out of broadband, and the gains for an overarching approach to climate change require a more European focus. This in turn will require institutional reform at the European level. Failure to address this Europe-wide agenda will leave Europe behind the USA.
  • Horn, M., Energy demand until 2010 in Ukraine, in “[Energy Policy>http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/jo...]”, Volume 27, Number 12, 1 November 1999, pp. 713-726(14).

    The economic development and environmental soundness of Ukraine is hampered and even threatened today by an outdated energy system, which delivers energy to the customers at high (internal and external) costs. Painful changes are necessary to adapt this system to the requirements of a market economy and international competition. Realistic projections of future energy consumption may help to clarify the amount of necessary changes and counter official projections which often belong to the realm of utopia. In this context the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) has been commissioned by the “German Advisory Group on Economic Reform in Ukraine” with an evaluation of energy projections for Ukraine in 1998. In this article I present an updated version of this study. To get a feeling for the growth potential of energy consumption in Ukraine an international comparison of specific energy consumption is made. Some rough scenarios of energy demand in Ukraine until 2010 are also sketched. In Scenario I assumptions were made concerning GDP growth in each sector, income elasticity of energy consumption, price elasticity of energy consumption and effects of technical progress. In Scenario II we assumed the development of specific energy consumption in Eastern Germany may provide a suitable guideline for Ukraine. Each approach is applied to a case with low and a case with high economic growth. The results of international comparisons are ambiguous for Ukraine. Energy consumption per GDP unit is extremely high in Ukraine, even in comparison to Russia and other transition countries. To this result contribute technical inefficiencies but also structural factors (high share of basic industry) as well as the persistent economic crisis. Energy consumption per capita in Ukraine is relatively high in relation to GDP per capita. Electricity consumption per capita in contrast nearly corresponds to the low average income in Ukraine. The results of our scenario calculations indicate that — in contrast to official projections — energy consumption in 2010 will probably be lower than in 1995 — even with high economic growth. In view of the slow growth prospect of overall energy demand it will not be necessary to expand coal production and electricity generation with nuclear energy in order to reduce energy imports. This conclusion would even be strengthened if the government stimulated energy-efficiency improvements by special programmes that are not taken into account in our scenarios.
  • International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 2006 Review, SourceOCDE Energie, Volume 2006, Number 25, December 2006, pp. i-400(401).

    What are the latest developments in energy policy and markets in the 26 member countries of the International Energy Agency and other key non-member countries such as China, India and Russia? This compilation contains a broad analysis of recent trends and an easily accessible overview of energy policy during the last 12 months.
    The years 2005-2006 can be characterised by acute energy policy challenges, including volatile energy markets, a pro-longed activation of IEA’s coordinated stock draw after Hurricane Katrina well into 2006, and continued geopolitical tensions in a number of producing countries. The macroeconomic impact of extremely high energy prices raised concerns while gas supply crises in Europe in January 2006 further sharpened the focus on security of supply. Accelerating indications of global climate change increased pressure to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
    The broader overview section of the 2006 edition examines trends in energy markets, including an analysis of energy demand and supply, energy prices and energy related CO2 emissions. It highlights key policy trends across member and non-member countries on energy security, energy market reform, climate change mitigation, energy efficiency, renewables and energy R&D. The book contains a special chapter on energy efficiency, which compares the most successful efficiency policies of member countries on the basis of In-Depth Review findings of the past three years. It also presents the major findings of the World Energy Outlook 2006, key statistical information and brief summaries of major IEA publications released during the past year.
  • International Energy Agency (IEA),Ukraine: Energy Policy Review 2006, SourceOCDE Energie, Volume 2006, Number 21, October 2006, pp. i-384(385)

    Ukraine has one of the most energy-intensive economies in the industrialised world. While energy consumption has dropped since the country’s independence, reliance on imports, particularly on gas from Russia, has not declined. This dependence increases risks for security of supply.
    As tension between Ukraine and its main energy supplier has grown in recent years, the country’s energy policy is driven by a strong desire to improve domestic energy security and reduce natural gas imports. Energy transit through Ukraine is significant. Due to its geographic position, the country plays a major role in securing Europe’s energy needs: 84% of Russian gas supplies to Europe transit through Ukraine via pipeline.
    How can the country meet these challenges? Ukraine: Energy Policy Review 2006 identifies three key priority areas for action: energy efficiency, cost-reflective pricing and transparency. Efficiency represents not only Ukraine’s single best opportunity to improve energy security but is also vital for the country’s growth and development.
  • Johnson, D., EU-Russian Energy Policy. Single or Multiple Policy Paradigms?, in “Energy & Environment”, Volume 15, Number 3, 1 July 2004, pp. 451-468(18). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    This article explores possible explanatory frameworks for the increasingly important EU-Russian energy relationship. It begins with an examination of traditional policy paradigms from the separate perspectives of both parties. Through exploration of the energy security situation in the European Union and the supply position in Russia, the paper concludes that the overall EU-Russian energy relationship can be best explained through a framework of mutual interest and dependency: that is, the EU is becoming increasingly, but not totally, dependent on Russian energy supplies, particularly of gas and Russia is becoming increasingly, but not totally dependent, on European markets. Nevertheless, other paradigms continue to yield useful insights in relation to individual components of the EU-Russian energy relationship.
  • Johnson, D., EU–Russian Energy Links: A Marriage of Convenience?, in “Government and Opposition”, Volume 40, Number 2, Spring 2005, pp. 256-277(22).

    This article explores issues of energy supply security from the perspective of the EU–Russian energy relationship and of competing foreign energy policy paradigms. Using approaches developed by Peter Rutland within the context of Russia’s energy policy towards the CIS and the three pillars of EU energy policy as a starting point, the article concludes that the overall EU–Russian energy relationship can be best explained through a framework of mutual interest and dependency: that is, the EU is becoming increasingly, but not totally, dependent on Russian energy, particularly gas; and Russia is becoming increasingly, but not totally, dependent on European markets. Nevertheless, other paradigms continue to yield useful insights in relation to individual components of the EU–Russian energy relationship.
  • Kaygusuz, K., Oil and Gas Production and Consumption in Turkey, in “Energy Exploration & Exploitation”, Volume 20, Number 1, 1 February 2002, pp. 37-50(14). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Turkey has dynamic economic development and rapid population growth. It also has macroeconomic, and especially monetary, instability. The net effect of these factors is that Turkey’s energy demand has grown rapidly almost every year and is expected to continue growing, but the investment necessary to cover the growing demand has not been forthcoming at the desired pace. On the other hand, Turkey’s strategic location makes it a natural "energy bridge" between major oil and gas producing areas in the Middle East and Caspian Sea regions on the other hand, and consumer markets in Europe on the other. Oil consumption has increased in recent years in Turkey, and this trend is expected to continue, with growth of 2-3 % annually in coming years. Oil provides around 43 % of Turkey’s total energy requirements, but its share is declining (as the share of natural gas rises). Around 90 % of Turkey’s oil supplies are imported, mainly from the Middle East and Russia. On the other hand, current gas production in Turkey meets 2.8 % of domestic consumption requirements. Turkish natural gas is projected to increase dramatically in coming years, with the prime consumers expected to be industry and power plants. Turkey has chosen natural gas as the preferred fuel for the massive amount of new power plant capacity to be added in coming years.
  • Kemal Ozturk, H., Hepbasli, A., Natural Gas Implementation in Turkey. Part 2: Natural Gas Pipeline Projects, in “Energy Sources”, Volume 26, Number 3, February 2004, pp. 287-297(11). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    The Caspian Sea (CS) region’s oil and gas potential has attracted much attention since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The nations in the CS region, namely Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are already major energy producers, and production will increase with additional investment, technology, and the development of new export outlets. Oil and gas transportation is a crucial and contentious issue in the CS/Central Asia regions. The main objective of the present study is to investigate Turkey’s natural gas (NG) pipelines and its role in the CS region. NG consumption has started in 1987 at 0.5 billion cubic meter (Bcm) and reached 16 Bcm in 2001. It is also projected that NG consumption will reach 55 and 82 Bcm annually in 2010 and 2020, respectively. Recent developments have showed once again Turkey’s role on the way to demand markets from the supply points in the CS region.
  • Kivikari, U., The Northern Dimension — One Pillar of the Bridge Between Russia and the EU, in “Russian Economic Trends”, Volume 11, Number 3, September 2002, pp. 26-30(05).

    Although Russia is not an applicant for membership of the European Union, it is linked to European integration in many ways. The EU Tacis programme, started at the beginning of the 1990s, provided early assistance for Russia’s transition to a market economy and market–oriented international integration. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia, which came into force in 1997, was a milestone, as were mutual cooperation strategies developed by each of the sides at the end of the 1990s. Naturally, Russia’s internal reform progress and its preparation for WTO membership are also significant for EU–Russia relations. Current steps towards creation of the Common European Economic Space, uniting the EU and Russia, represent a new level of cooperation.
    In addition to EU programmes and projects, which are purely Russia–related, Russia also figures large in the so–called Northern Dimension (ND) policy of the EU. The role of the ND in the network of EU–Russia institutions and programmes, where the above–mentioned general elements are only small parts of the whole, needs further clarification. It so happens that the most promising opportunities and demanding challenges of the ND policy begin with the letter ‘e’. Omitting some key areas, such as economy and education, sub–sections of this article will be devoted to energy, environment, eDimension, enterprises and EU enlargement.
  • Kulczycka, J., Lipinska, A., Barriers to liberalisation of the Polish energy-sector, in “Applied Energy”, Volume 76, Number 1, September 2003, pp. 229-238(10).

    Energy is a specific product, which is produced and sold generally in one region. Therefore clients on the energy market have usually only one energy distributor: the suppliers have the exclusive right to provide energy in the chosen area. The market was centralised and regulated by the government, which set the energy price. Looking for the possibility of choosing an energy producer providing lower prices, the clients have been urging changes in the energy trade. The government is also trying to deregulate the energy market and make it more competitive by creating the power exchanges, on which trading is much easier and effective in many countries. In Poland on 7 December 1999, there was established the Polish Power Exchange. Its aim is to increase the efficiency of the Polish energy-sector, adjust it to competitive conditions and the requirements of the European Union and to minimise the costs of leading the business. However energy trading in Poland has met many problems, i.e. (a) the existence of long-term contracts, which prevent the liberalisation of the market and continue strengthening the monopoly position of the Polish Power Grid Company (PSE SA) (Transmitting-System Operator), (b) the lack of co-ordinated actions to provide the third-party access to the grid (third-party access principle), which means opening the electric-energy market to final consumers (thereby each recipient can choose the energy producer, who offers the best price and terms of delivery), (c) ineffective Balancing Market (which is a 24 h market). All these difficulties cause that the turn-over on the Polish Power Exchange to be relatively low compared with other countries. Solutions will be proposed in this paper which can promote the liberalisation of the energy trade both from conventional and renewable sources.
  • Laroui, F., Tellegen E., Tourilova K., Joint implementation in energy between the EU and Russia Out look and potential, in “Energy Policy”, Volume 32, Number 7, May 2004, pp. 899-914(16).
  • Ogutcu, M., Eurasian energy prospects and politics - Need for a longer-term Western strategy, in “Futures”, Volume 27, Number 1, January 1995, pp. 37-63(27).

    The Eurasian world around the Caspian Sea is likely to become an important oil and natural gas producer. This region is a gateway to three regions that are of great strategic importance to the West: to the east lies China and the rest of Asia; to the south lies Iran, Afghanistan, and the Islamic world; to the west and north lies Russia, Turkey and Europe. This is a region much larger than Western Europe. Future developments in Eurasia will therefore affect fundamentally not only the security of Western energy supplies, but also the traditional geopolitical equation in that part of the globe. The West needs to address current problems there as well as to pursue a proactive policy of conflict prevention. The European Union already imports half of its primary energy requirements, which will increase to 75% by the year 2020. Mutually rewarding energy cooperation offers the best means for integrating this region into the world family of market democracies. Turkey, a reassuringly Western ally, stands well positioned geographically, politically and economically to act as an energy ‘bridge’ between Eurasia and the West.
  • Ozturk H.K., Hepbasli A., Natural Gas Implementation in Turkey. Part 1: Turkey’s Natural Gas Demand and Supplies, in “Energy Sources”, Volume 26, Number 3, February 2004, pp. 277-286(10). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    The main objective of the present study is to investigate Turkey’s natural gas (NG) demand and supplies by giving the structure of the Turkish gas industry, NG pricing policy, and NG agreements. Turkey began to import NG from Russia in 1987 under a contract that provided for the delivery of 6 billion cubic meters annually (Bcma) for 25 years. The first contract, signed in 1988, stipulates delivery of 2 Bcma over a 20-yr period. The build-up of the Turkish gas market started by introducing gas in power generation in 1987 and in fertilizer production in 1988. Later contracts provide for total imports of 4 Bcma from the late 1990s. NG sales started at 0.5 Bcm in 1987 and reached to around 16 Bcm in 2001. Turkish NG demand is projected to increase extremely rapidly in coming years, with the prime consumers expected to be NG-fired electric power plants and industrial users.
  • Price, C.W., The Effect of Liberalizing UK Retail Energy Markets on Consumers->http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi..., in “Oxford Review of Economic Policy”, Volume 21, Number 1, 2005, pp. 128-144(17). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    This paper describes the evolution of supply competition in the UK residential energy market and the extent to which consumers in general, and vulnerable households in particular, have benefited from liberalization. It concludes that earlier fears about higher prices for vulnerable groups from tariff rebalancing have not so far been realized. However, in assessing the extent to which suppliers may be able to exploit individual or joint market power, increasing concentration in the downstream market may result in adverse effects on all consumers, especially low-income households. This poses a threat to the government’s programme to reduce fuel poverty, particularly at a time when upstream costs are expected to rise to reflect environmental concerns.
  • Rempel, H., Natural Gas for Europe. Present State and Predictions for a Stable Supply in the Future, in “Energy Exploration & Exploitation”, Volume 20, Numbers 2-3, 1 February 2002, pp. 219-237(19). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Natural gas provides 21% of the primary energy supply of Europe. According to EU predictions, this share will increase to approximately 28% in 2020 and dependence on natural gas imports will increase. The question arises how the increasing demand for gas can be assured? This will be analysed in this paper focussing on the resource base, technical viability, as well as contract security. As far as the resource base for natural gas is concerned, Western Europe’s situation is quite favourable. Despite little resources of its own, Western Europe is surrounded by countries and regions with high gas potential (Russia, North Africa, the Caspian region and the Middle East). In addition to a sufficient resource base, production and transport play an important role, especially if there are long distances between producer and consumer countries. Transport costs are a decisive factor, due to the lower energy density of natural gas than that of oil and coal, which limits the distance for transport of gas. Therefore, natural gas markets are mainly regional. Only large gas fields (especially supergiants) are suitable for natural gas supply over long distances despite high infrastructure costs. An extensive pipeline network exists for the gas supply in Europe. This network has to be expanded in the future, however. The price of natural gas is coupled to the price of crude oil. Sizeable fluctuations in the oil price are a factor of uncertainty for capital investment decisions. In order to secure the future gas supply and to take advantage of this environmentally friendly energy source in competition with other primary fuels, all cost-reducing measures must be taken. Political measures must be taken to safeguard the very long-term capital investments.
  • Roberts, J., The Black Sea and European Energy Security, in “Southeast European and Black Sea Studies”, Volume 6, Number 2, June 2006, pp. 207-223(17). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    This article addresses the core issue of the transit of oil and gas across Black Sea countries and its impact on European energy security. The littoral countries of the Black Sea play a critical role in European energy security, not least because they participate significantly in oil and gas reaching Europe’s major consumer markets from further afield. They can be expected to continue to do so even as the European Union attempts to diversify its supply sources. Regarding oil, the article particularly focuses on the question of the Bosphorus bypasses, detailing and comparing alternative proposals for pipelines through Black Sea littoral nations. In terms of gas, it assesses the role played by Russia in European gas transit and supply and the dilemma in which Moscow finds itself as it weighs up its current monopoly over Central Asian gas transit with its own oil and gas investment requirements.
  • Sanglerat, A., Transition in the energy sector of Central European countries: Prospects for gas demand, in “Fuel and Energy Abstracts”, Volume 36, Number 6, November 1995, pp. 476-476(1).
  • Svedberg, M., Energy in Eurasia: the Dependency Game, in “Transition Studies Review”, Volume 14, Number 1, May 2007, pp. 195-202(8). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Russia, Europe, and a number of transit countries are involved in a high-stake game about energy which is characterized by a high degree of interdependency and security. The dependencies go in all directions, but what makes the game particularly interesting is that it is neither economically rational nor static. It should lie in all parties’ interest to recognize the strong element of interdependency and transform some of the energy security politics into energy economics.
  • Winrow, G., Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor, in “Turkish Studies”, Volume 5, Number 2, Summer 2004, pp. 23-42(20). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Washington and Ankara have traditionally emphasized the strategic significance of transportation corridors to carry Caspian energy to European markets via Turkey. Transfers of Iraqi gas to Europe may re-kindle an apparent flagging US interest in the geopolitical value of pipelines crossing Turkey. Europe’s long-term energy security needs could be met if Turkey becomes a key gas transit state, although Russia will continue to dominate the European gas market. Ankara is also aiming to re-export gas contracted to the Turkish market to avoid paying substantial compensation to natural gas suppliers. However, pipeline networks must be built before natural gas may be transported from the Caspian region, North Africa and the Middle East to Europe via Turkey.

ENERGY IN RUSSIA

This article investigates issues related to industrial restructuring in Russia. Based on extensive sectoral data it examines, more particularly, levels and changes in labour productivity, unit labour costs and revealed comparative advantages for a large number of Russian industrial sectors. The main findings are the following. First, impressive increases in labour productivity have been achieved since 1997, especially during the post-crisis period. Second, this has been true for all major sectors, with the exception of those which are still predominantly state-controlled or which suffer from strong state interference. Third, there have been significant relative adjustments within the industrial sector, as labour productivity increased more in less productive sectors. Since the crisis, relative unit labour costs have also adjusted considerably, as less competitive sectors experienced larger labour force reductions. Fourth, international competitiveness â-” as measured by revealed comparative advantage â-” remains limited to a small number of sectors that mainly produce primary commodities (particularly hydrocarbons) and energy-intensive basic goods. And finally, there has been a tendency for further specialisation in resource-based exports in recent years.

This article presents an assessment of Russia’s energy sector, its current state and planned future direction. The analysis of Russia’s energy trends is based on a set of indicators for sustainable energy development (ISED), developed under the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The article discusses Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020, and outlines major developments and challenges of the country’s energy system. Russia’s energy priorities, captured in the Strategy to 2020, emphasize securing a stable and uninterrupted energy supply; reducing energy intensity and improving energy efficiency; developing the domestic energy resource base; reducing negative environmental impacts; and ensuring affordable energy for the poorer segments of the population. Energy needs and challenges are discussed in relation to the three aspects of sustainability as defined in Agenda 21: economic, social and environmental. Concerns are expressed regarding environmental repercussions of energy development, in particular since Russia’s 1998 economic rebound. There are also concerns, despite the economic recovery, that anticipated increases in energy tariffs may exceed the affordability of poorer segments of the population.

A prominent specialist on the Russian economy discusses two preceding papers entitled "Resource Rents and the Russian Economy" by Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes and "Can Russia Break the ’Resource Curse’?" by Rudiger Ahrend. Focusing on Russia’s oil and gas sector, the author comments on the five components of resource rents, the ownership and efficiency of the oil and gas companies, the Yukos affair, the forms of state intervention in the affairs of the sector, symptoms of Dutch disease precipitated by resource abundance, and the shift from the Anglo-American to the OPEC model.

A prominent specialist on the Russian economy provides a framing comment on two preceding papers entitled "Russia’s Energy Policy" (by Vladimir Milov, Leonard Coburn, and Igor Danchenko) and "Russia’s Energy Policy: A Divergent View" (by Matthew J. Sagers). The author argues that Russia’s current energy policy should be viewed as an outcome of competition between three overlapping programs. In this context, he identifies three policy models—the old Soviet, the liberal or oligarchic, and the most recent state capitalist. The latter is currently supported by President Putin, who prioritizes diversification of the country’s economy at the expense of diminished investments in the oil and gas sector.

Two recent trends have rekindled the debate concerning the place and strategy of Russia on the world oil scene. The first is the development of its oil production and the second is the gradual resumption of control of the country’s oil policy by President Vladimir Putin’s government. Will Russia be a key variable in world energy balances and could the nation, as some suggest and even desire, become an alternative supply to OPEC and/or challenge Saudi Arabia’s position? If so, is that what Russia actually wants? In this study, we attempt to answer some of these important questions by assessing and comparing the capabilities of the producing countries, while studying Russia’s aims and objectives for the petroleum sector in the future, when demand for energy supplies is forecast to rise considerably.

Since the late 1990s, Russia’s oil production has experienced a steady resurgence. As a result, Moscow has regained its status as a major oil producer, exporter and crucial player in global energy markets. This paper argues that this rising Russian role should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. It examines some of the main characteristics of the country’s oil industry, notably the investment climate, production-sharing agreement regime and pipeline capacity. Russia’s rising production is likely to enhance global energy security. Moscow and other major oil producers share a similar goal — stability of the oil market and international economy. Today’s energy market should not be analysed in zero-sum terms. Major oil producers coordinate their policy with each other and with major consumers.

This paper assesses possible ways to efficient energy use for sustainable development in Russia. Based on the research of the Energy Institute (EnIn), Moscow, [1,2], analysis of different studies of the power sector in Russia is provided to generalise the state of the art in energy production, distribution and consumption, and technological innovations for renewable resources utilisation. Recommendations for policy-making are also given.

An analysis of the implementation of the main items of the Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020 in the year 2005 and a comparison of indices reached in 2003-2005 with the predicted ones are presented. The development of a new version of the Energy Strategy for the period up to 2030 is proposed that takes into account recent changes in domestic and world power engineering.

Russia’s oil sector is critical to the country’s overall economic development at present and may affect the whole Russian economy in the next several years. Nevertheless, like all other energy sectors in the Russian Federation, it faces a number of problems, including low domestic prices, a poor regulatory framework, little competition, underinvestment and environmental failure. There is little know-ledge of the real needs and problems of the sector, including high production costs, weak transport infrastructure, low investment and obsolete technical equipment, but instead there is permanent political pressure to increase the tax burden. In this context the analysis presented in the article contributes to ongoing discussions and presents a number of numerical estimations relating to the current situation of the oil sector in Russia, including overall sector revenue, cost estimates, total tax burden, present level of investment etc., and simulations of the situation in the sector under different future oil price scenarios.

This paper considers current challenges and possibilities for Russia from the perspective of "environmental security". Environmental security is a term emphasising the connection between environmental health and socio-political issues, including traditional national security issues. An environmental security approach provides a very fruitful way to consider critical challenges facing Russia. Russia has profound environmental problems whose severity and pervasiveness could undermine its attempts to build political and economic stability. The natural resource base and human health have suffered, and continue to face, profound deterioration. Since the end of the Soviet system, there has been no significant progress in defining and addressing major environmental and associated health problems. Major barriers include a lack of legal, financial and civil infrastructures; an unreliable legal system; rampant criminal elements; and a lack of political accountability. The paper concludes with observations about possible avenues for improvement, by addressing fundamental infrastructure weaknesses, coupled with actions to staunch the outward flow of wealth, increase bilateral and multilateral agreements, and attract external capital.

The paper, by two prominent American specialists on the Soviet and post-Soviet economies, explores the role of Russia’s energy resources. The authors offer a more inclusive definition of oil and gas rents than is traditionally given and analyze how the mechanisms for distributing those rents have changed over time. They show how fluctuations in the level of rents have played a key role in Russian economic performance. Oil rents, in particular, are shown to have varied widely over the past 35 years. The paper also examines how the distribution of rents affects the sustainability of production. It concludes with some reflections on the proper organization of the energy sector.

This paper analyses the impact of news, oil prices, and international financial market developments on daily returns on Russian bond and stock markets. First, regarding returns, energy news affects returns, while news from the war in Chechnya is not significant. Market volatility does not appear to be sensitive to either type of news. Second, a significant effect of the growth in oil prices on Russian stock returns is detected. Third, the international influence on Russian financial markets depends upon the degree of financial liberalization. The higher the degree of financial liberalization, the stronger is the impact of US stock returns on Russian financial markets. In addition, banking reform and interest rate liberalization efforts seem to dictate the globalization of Russian stock markets, while it is the progress in liberalizing securities markets and non-bank financial institutions that matters more for the globalization of Russian bond markets.

  • Ivanova N., Pavlov, G., Non-Payments in the Energy Sector, in “Russian Economic Trends”, Volume 9, Number 1, March 2000, pp. 19-29(11). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

Despite the reduction in arrears and barter observed after the rouble devaluation of the August 1998 crisis the phenomenon of non-payments in Russia is yet to be addressed. Non-payments of all forms remain especially severe in transactions involving the energy sector, defined as an aggregation of the electricity and natural gas industries. The high concentration of overdue receivables and non-monetary forms of settlement in the energy sector provides evidence that power and gas industries subsidise a large share of the economy, including industrial and social consumers. Social and political costs of the closure of large nonviable industrial enterprises unable to pay their operational costs force the governments of all levels to prevent their disconnection from the energy supplies. The authorities effectively encourage EUS and Gazprom to tolerate ‘strategic’ customers’s arrears by turning a blind eye to natural monopolies tax obligations. On the other hand, the persistent failure of the federal and regional authorities to comply with the budget laws have prompted the budget-funded organisation to run arrears to the energy suppliers, which, in turn, led to numerous tax offsets involving the electricity and gas companies. In addition to the government’s policies there are structural factors specific to the energy sector. Imperfections of the delivery network allow the rent-seeking electricity resellers and regional utilities managers to use nontransparent barter chains. This and the lack of supervision by UES enable them to put up with non-payments by the customeres and divert funds from the power generators. Consolidation of control over UES subsidiaries accompanied by the active debt settlement policy and modernisation of the delivery network are the structural measures that required to reduce the scale of non-payments in the energy sector.

The study of the Earth’s thermal field testifies to the presence of a huge, practically inexhaustible and ecologically pure source of thermal energy in the interior. These geothermal resources are subdivided into petrothermal and hydrothermal varieties representing thermal energy accumulated in rocks and groundwater fluids, respectively. Extraction of thermal energy from hard rocks is as yet at the stage of experiment, whereas the hydrothermal resources are already successfully exploited in many countries supplying electrical and thermal energy. In Russia, geothermal resources are predominantly utilized for space heating in several cities and settlements of the Northern Caucasus and Kamchatka with a total population of 500 000. Besides, greenhouses with a total area of 465 000 m^2 use terrestrial heat in some regions of Russia. The electricity is generated by some geothermal power plants (GeoPP) only in the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kuril Islands. At the present time, the Pauzhetka GeoPP (installed capacity 11 MW_e) and Severo-Mutnovka GeoPP (12 MW) are in operation in Kamchatka. Near the latter power plant, the unit (50 MW) was constructed in 2001 and will come into operation in 2002. Moreover, another GeoPP (100 MW) is now in project in the same place. Two small GeoPP are in operation in the Kurils (Kunashir and Iturup islands) with installed capacity of 2.6 and 6 MW, respectively.

The paper addresses and compares the dynamics of energy intensity of Russia and some industrial countries. The possible impacts of two scenarios of Russian economy development in the next 30 years on the energy intensity of industry, transport and residential sectors are considered. A forecasting method is based on application of a set of models, including a 20-sector dynamic model of Russia’s economy. Analysis shows that the autonomous decline in energy/GNP ratio in Russia will be much more intensive than in Europe. However, all things being equal, the energy intensity of the economy and per capita energy consumption in Russia should be higher than in Western Europe due to peculiarities in the structure of the economy, the climate and other factors.

A Russian economist and a Norwegian political scientist, both long-term observers of the Russian energy industries, discuss the outlook for the Russian oil industry. The focus is on the relationship between reserves and industry strategies, and is presented from the perspective of an oil-producing enterprise. The authors analyze trends in reserve exploration and development and compare them with oil-industry investment patterns. They discuss differences and similarities among companies, as well as implications for future output. Also examined in the paper are factors inhibiting long-term private investment in the oil industry (including factors specific to particular companies) as well as the relevant policies of the government.

The fate of the Russian economy, the dynamics of the new Russian élite and the outcome of the country’s still-uncertain post-communist transition are related in no small measure to Russia’s vast oil and gas resources. Energy is a key factor in President Vladmir Putin’s diplomacy - whether with Iran and Iraq, former Soviet republics or the EU. Energy is also an important subtext in US-Russian relations, both as a source of cooperation and, in some respects, of tension. The West needs to recognise Russia’s real strategic concerns, and to distinguish between Russia working to protect the transport of a vital export commodity and Russia refusing to renounce its ’imperial past’. The challenge to Western diplomacy is how to accommodate legitimate Russian interests without jeopardising US and NATO interests.

Resource-rich states throughout the developing world are prone to rent-seeking, excessive borrowing, wasteful spending, and unbalanced growth as well as states with weak institutions and authoritarian regimes. Are the five energy-rich Soviet successor states necessarily doomed to repeat this experience, often referred to as the “resource curse”? This paper advances and tests the hypothesis that Russia and Kazakhstan are more likely to avoid the “resource curse” than Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan because they privatized their energy sectors. Specifically, we find that privatization offers a potential path out of the “resource curse” when it involves a transfer of ownership to domestic actors. Although Kazakhstan initially appeared to be developing a viable tax regime in response to foreign investors, over the long term Kazakhstan’s tax regime has become increasingly volatile and dependent upon these foreign investors. In contrast, domestic oil companies are helping to foster the development of an increasingly viable tax regime in Russia.

The Soviet nuclear power establishment, the second largest in the world, has embarked on an ambitious program to build dozens of reactors between 2003 and 2020. The rejuvenation of that Soviet establishment through Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) is based on the technological utopianism of Russian political and scientific leaders. They see nuclear energy as a way to maintain Russia’s great power status. They have adopted approaches to reactor development prominent in the Soviet era. These include building dozens of new reactors in construction time faster than seen before in world history, upgrading several Chernobyl-type reactors, accepting spent fuel from abroad for storage in exchange for cash, and floating—literally—nuclear power stations on barges for use in Russia’s far north and for export. There are few controls on MinAtom within the government, and public involvement in the technology assessment process is limited.

On what does the steady development of the economics of the North-Western region depend? Ecological and social aspects are always interconnected. The North Dvina river system assures all freight turnover. Local Palaeolithic digs are of great importance for comprehension of the late Perm epoch. The North-Western region is one of the largest urban territories in Russia. What stabilises its energy market and what does not?

To those working on climate change, it is obvious that energy policy should be influenced by climate change considerations. The question that this paper seeks to answer is, to what extent do they influence policy and what contribution can a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of climate change options have on the formulation of that policy? We seek to understand this by looking in some detail at energy policy formulation in Russia. To do so it is necessary to look at the whole set of issues that determine energy policy. These include energy security, macroeconomic and uncertainty factors, local environmental issues and social issues. The analysis has been carried out for a specific case ± that of the RF, where energy policy is currently under formulation to 2010. Two options have been looked at: a "High Coal" option, where there would be a substantial change in fuel mix away from gas to coal; and a "High Gas" option where the current fuel mix is retained and the increase in demand is met from all sources in proportion to current use. The analysis shows that, at international prices for fuels, the High Coal option is attractive. However, when we include the potential decline in price for natural gas in the European market, the relative preference for this option drops dramatically but it still remains the preferred option. When account is also taken of the carbon benefits of the High Gas option, using plausible values for carbon, the attraction of the High Coal option is further reduced but not altered. When account is finally taken of the health associated with the lower use of coal in the High Gas option, the preference can be reversed but it requires a critical value for the health benefits. This critical value - at around 3,000 for a life year lost - is plausible for the RF; if anything the actual value is probably higher. What the analysis shows is the need for a careful evaluation of the different factors determining energy policy. Among these is climate change. It is not the critical factor but it can be an important one. Perhaps more important are the environmental benefits that go with the lower carbon High Gas options.

This paper gives a view of the challenges of nuclear liability in the specific context of the Russian Federation’s legal system. Starting from the Chernobyl disaster and the benefits of nuclear energy, a detailed examination of the development of both internal law and international law regulating nuclear liability matters in Russia is given. Special attention is paid to the regimes established by bilateral treaties, the system of government bodies responsible for nuclear energy affairs, and the consequences of the 1963 Vienna Convention’s entry into force for Russia. The value of Russian experience in finding the resolution of global nuclear liability issues is discussed.

A team comprising a former Russian policymaker and American analysts of the current Russian energy policy examines the course of that policy and its limitations during the post-Soviet period. In the process, they critically analyze key problems in Russia’s oil, gas, coal, and electricity sectors that represent a potential drag on growth of the entire Russian economy and at the very least call into question the sustainability of further increases in exports to the West. The authors explore in considerable depth and detail both the factors underlying the recent increase in government intervention in the energy sector and the likely consequences for domestic production, consumption, resource security, and critical exports.

The article presents a long-term forecast for the Russian fuel and energy complex (FEC) for the period to 2030. Projections were made for two scenarios of Russia’s socioeconomic development, which were developed at the IEF in 2005-2006. FEC forecasts were built for three macroregions of Russia: the European part, the Urals and West Siberia, and East Siberia and the Far East. Key outcomes of the scenario forecasts correspond to the base case, which provides background concepts of the long-term development of the FEC. The regional aspect is analyzed in depth, which made it possible to build prognostic energy balances for three macroregions that take account of the economics of production, transportation, distribution, and utilization of energy resources.

Russia is a key player in the Kyoto process, and the fate of the Protocol itself heavily depends on future developments in the country, in particular in its energy sector. This article analyses the contradictory and complex relationships between carbon dioxide emissions, gas exports to Western Europe and the energy security of Russia. The paper reviews emerging trends in the energy sector of Russia that will have a long-term impact on these three parameters and assesses the possible influence of these trends on the implementation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution in Russia. Proceeding from the latest developments in the Russian energy scene, the author tries to forecast how Russia will integrate into the international community in the energy sphere. The study concludes that gas export commitments to Europe will be met despite the serious problems in the domestic gas sector, that energy saving in Russia is the most feasible way of finding a compromise between the three parameters, and that enhancing the energy security of Russia might have rather controversial consequences for Europe.

A noted American analyst of Russian, Central Asian, and Transcaucasian oil and gas industries and markets offers his own perspective on issues raised in the preceding paper on Russia’s energy policy (Milov et al., 2006). While generally concurring that Russia indeed pursues an ad hoc (rather than systemic) energy policy, he expresses divergent views on the role of government-regulated versus market-based pricing in final and primary energy use, reasons for the intense flows of oil and gas to Europe, the role of pipelines in determining oil export allocations, and the contribution of regional monopolies and refining capacity to domestic oil product prices.

This paper addresses problems of marine environment protection in Russia, with an emphasis on the legislative and institutional basis for protecting the seas from oil pollution. The status of the Black and Baltic Seas is described, together with the relevant technical, organisational, and economic elements. As an example of a comprehensive approach for tackling the problems under consideration, we present briefly the "Complex programme for the prevention of marine pollution caused by ships and ports activity", recently elaborated by a broad Russian expert group.

This paper deals with the environmental and public impact of radiation factors of the land-based storage facility being designed for dispositioned N/SM reactor compartments in the Russian North-West region. The capacity is sized to accommodate reactor compartments of all the Russian North Navy N/SM after their disposition. Based on the study results, it can be concluded that the creation of this facility will not lead to worsening the radiation situation for the environment and public in this region over permissible limits, both in normal operating conditions and emergency situations.

The paper provides a scenario exercise for Russian economic development until 2017. Russia will continue to grow for several years at least, as an emerging middle class drives consumption growth and structural change, though not in exports. Import propensity grows fast, and the recent current account surplus is disappearing fast. Investment also seems to be surging. Two dimensions seem crucial for building scenarios. Will Russia be able to increase energy production and exports? Will there be a meaningful diversification of production and exports, needed for maintaining the current account and to provide jobs for a large if slowly decreasing labour force? Ensuing scenarios have clear political implications.

Possible volumes of the use of renewable energy sources in arctic regions of Russia are considered. With allowance for the climatic conditions and local consumers it is the most expedient to built wind-driven power plants in combination with diesels. Places of possible erection and capacities of wind-diesel plants with total output of 95 MW are presented. This will make it possible to reduce considerably the delivery of expensive diesel fuel (by 106,000 tons coal equivalent a year). The expected investment is estimated at 3.9 billion rubles.

ENERGY ISSUES IN THE CASPIAN

This paper provides a brief overview of the political economy of Caspian oil. It begins by situating the Caspian region’s oil sectors in the larger global market, before proceeding to examine the ways in which the Azerbaijani, Turkmen, and Kazakh oil sectors have been organised and governed since 1991. The paper then considers the likely consequences of recent policy shifts in Kazakhstan, the region’s most important oil producer. A further section considers the questions of transport infrastructure and export routes, which remain particularly complex problems for Central Asia’s landlocked producers. This is followed by a brief conclusion. The paper’s central argument is that it is by no means certain that the Caspian region’s hydrocarbon potential will be developed in a timely, economically efficient way. While the impact of geology, geography, and international price movements can hardly be ignored, policy-makers can do much to raise or lower the long-term elasticity of the supply by the Commonwealth of Independent States. Unfortunately, policy in the region seems, on present trends, likely to lower it.

This article discusses the global geopolitics of energy security in the post-Cold War environment. Energy companies headquartered in western countries have long history of accessing energy resources beyond borders through invasion of the host by their home state, followed by domination and the creation of property rights to explore and sell oil. Conquest and domination, respectively voluntary exchange are the survival strategies of human groups in the global system. The article differentiates between demand-induced scarcity, supply-induced scarcity, structural scarcity, and the creation and transfer of property rights. Together, the behaviors referred to by these concepts create a field of social forces that cross state borders and involve state and non-state actors. Monopolizing control over energy resources by the Anglo-Saxon maritime powers was one of the causes of both world wars. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been creating a land-based extension of its post-World War II defense perimeter. It runs from Romania, via Central Eurasia, to Israel, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Overland transport increasingly connects economies and energy supplies on the Central European and Pacific sides of the Eurasian continent. The US, therefore, has decided to bring under its military umbrella the energy-carrying region between industrializing China and India, recovering Russia and unifying Europe. China’s policy to secure its energy supply by direct contracting with the home state and legal owner of the stock, brings it into confrontation with the US. The latter consumes one-quarter of the energy assumed to be present in the Greater Middle East. In recent decades, the Chinese economy has been growing at a rate substantially above the worldwide growth rate, which implies that China’s share in the world economy is increasing over time. Accordingly, China is becoming more dependent on imports, especially energy. The US domestic oil production peaked in 1970-71. Thus, the US has no spare capacity to provide its allies in Europe and East Asia in case of an interruption of supply. The conquest of Iraq by the US and its allies, and the transfer of the management of the oil sector from the state to a US tax-paying private company opens a new era of violent interstate competition for access to and control of fossil energy sources.

The intense interest shown by the major international oil and gas companies in the Caspian Sea testifies to its promising potentials. The seven- hundred-mile long Caspian Sea is located in northwest Asia. Five countries – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – share the Caspian basin. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian states became open to foreign investment and the region has reemerged as a potentially significant player in the global energy policy. Indeed, the geological potential of the Caspian region as a major source of oil and gas is not in doubt. The rate of investment, however, is (and will continue to be) determined by the perceived risk in the region. This report examines three socioeconomic and political challenges to the region: ethnic conflicts, disagreements over the most cost-effective pipeline routes, and disputes over the legal status of the Caspian.

The Caspian Sea region’s oil and gas potential has attracted the attention of the international oil and gas industry since the late 1980s and early 1990s with the breakup of the Soviet Union when investment in the region became possible. The nations in the Caspian Sea region – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – are already major energy producers. Production is expected to increase with additional investment, introduction of international technology, and the development of new export outlets. The Caspian Sea is sizeable (700 miles north to south). Six geologically discernable hydrocarbon basins underlie its waters (the Caspian Sea countries also have additional onshore basins). Uzbekistan does not directly border the Caspian Sea, but is considered to be in the Caspian region because it shares several of the region’s hydrocarbon basins, and because its proposed oil and gas export routes are also shared with the other Caspian countries.

The current fixation with the Caspian Basin’s alleged resource bonanza is exaggerating the region’s commercial and strategic significance, distorting US foreign-policy calculations and raising the risk of unnecessary contention with other actors, particularly Russia and Iran. The Caspian Basin’s oil reserves are significant, but logistic, economic and political hurdles will prevent their speedy development. For the foreseeable future, the Persian Gulf will remain a cheaper, easier and more secure alternative. Rather than focusing on the Caspian ’Great Game’, policy-makers should give more careful consideration to the growing ramifications of East Asia’s burgeoning dependence on Persian Gulf oil for global security.

In the aftermath of September 11, US strategy has shifted in the Central Asian region from protecting the sovereignty of the southern post-Soviet states to ensuring their stability in light of the dual impacts of energy development and the rising threat of Islamic terrorism. Although US-Russian cooperation has made strides, particularly concerning Russian acquiescence toward US and NATO military engagement in the region, geostrategic rivalry and conflicting economic goals have hindered a joint approach to initiatives regarding the region’s energy development. While both agree on the goal of maximising Russian and Caspian gas and petroleum exports, US policy is increasingly prioritising Central Asian energy prosperity as a key factor in the region’s ability to contain terrorism. Development of the region’s energy resources has therefore become a critical US security concern. Yet, by failing to engage with Russia in a meaningful cooperation that could encourage Moscow to diversify its own energy export prospects, competition between the two powers is likely to reduce, rather than improve, the effectiveness of either in offering the Central Asian states the kind of support they need to strengthen their domestic profiles or withstand the incursion of terrorism.

Energy security in the Caspian Basin is poised to become the fulcrum for partnership between the US, Russia and Europe. Unlike ’public’ goods issues, such as counter-terrorism and nonproliferation, where power asymmetries muddle common interests and reinforce contending strategic visions, the ’quasi-public’ and ’private’ goods characteristics of the oil and natural gas sectors generate complementary strategic priorities between transatlantic energy producers and consumers. Given the post-war challenges of bringing Iraqi oil back ’on line’, heightened tensions in the Middle East, growing Western hydrocarbon import dependency and Russia’s emergence as a new energy powerbroker, the US, Russia and member states of the EU are shedding traditional ’Great Game’ postures and looking to energy resources in the Caspian Basin to stabilize world markets. Applying theories of collective action, this article explores how the convergence of energy security interests can provide a catalyst for cooperatively unlocking Caspian energy, as well as a springboard for disentangling rival interests and visions pertaining to new security concerns.

Emboldened by the recovery of the domestic oil industry and determined to exploit comparative advantages in world markets, President Putin put Russia once again on the move to secure control over Caspian energy spoils. The revitalization of Moscow’s posture renewed debate over the contours of geopolitical competition in the region, and the effectiveness of non-military instruments of statecraft more generally. Yet, much of the controversy is misplaced due to empirical and theoretical oversights. The first is due to a misreading of the record of Moscow’s Caspian energy posture, and an under-appreciation for the mixed success of Russia’s energy leverage across the oil and gas sectors. The second comes from the failure to understand the conditions under which institutionally weak states can manipulate markets and regulatory mechanisms in global energy relations for purposes of national security. The article offers a first cut at substantiating these claims by examining the geoeconomic dimensions to Russia’s Caspian energy policy.

Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have been expected to become important players in the international oil and gas trade. Recent forecasts (1998) still assume net exports of the Caspian region to increase to 75-118 million tonnes of oil and 72-84 billion cubic meters of gas in 2010. However, the real development of the energy sector in these countries, since they gained national independence in 1991, has been dis-appointing. Oil production so far has hardly recovered from the post-Soviet slump (52 mt in 1998) and oil exports have remained marginal (18 mt, i.e. just one per cent of international trade flows). The region’s gas production fell from 146 bn cu m in 1990 to 80 bn cu m in 1998. Net gas exports diminished from 61 bn cu m in 1990 to a mere 5 bn cu m in 1998.
This paper analyses the development of the Caspian region’s energy sector over the last decade. It also looks at the reasons why the high hopes concerning its potential have so far been disappointed:

    • The macroeconomic development of all Caspian countries suffered badly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the incipient recovery after 1996/97 was stifled by the fallout of the financial turmoil in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after August 1998.
    • A number of technical, legal and political obstacles has so far prevented the implementation of large investment projects.
    • The restructuring of domestic oil and gas companies is further complicated by socio-economic obstacles, e.g. overemployment, untransparent systems of governance and the need to diversify regions dominated by a single industry. In view of the existing structural problems, the paper concludes that a major expansion of the region’s energy output and exports is unlikely in the medium term (this paper was submitted to the OPEC Review in January 1999).

ENERGY ISSUES IN CENTRAL ASIA

From the early days of Putin’s presidency, Russia’s energy policy towards Central Asia has been intertwined with the policy of counter-terrorism, which initially was aimed at exploiting the threat of the Taliban in order to cajole the post-Soviet regimes into closer cooperation with Moscow. The deployment of US and NATO forces in the region in autumn 2001 signified a serious shrinking of Russia’s influence but it invested considerable effort in recovering its position. A series of setbacks from spring 2004 to spring 2005 culminating in the ’orange revolution’ in Ukraine made this period a true annus horribilis for Russian foreign policy but the brutal crackdown on the uprising in Andijan, Uzbekistan in May 2005 was the turning point. It helped Russia to design a counter-revolutionary strategy according to which it would be ready to provide extensive support to the regimes that were ready to defend themselves with forceful means. In order to legitimize this support, Moscow decided to revive and strengthen several post-Soviet inter-state organizations that for many years had essentially been `paper structures’. Russia has achieved some success in instrumentalizing the counter-revolutionary momentum to advance its energy interests; in this sense, it certainly works much better than the tired counter-terrorism policy. Building on this success is going to be more difficult due to the pronounced anti-Western content of this strategy.

From the early days of Putin’s presidency, Russia’s energy policy towards Central Asia has been intertwined with the policy of counter-terrorism, which initially was aimed at exploiting the threat of the Taliban in order to cajole the post-Soviet regimes into closer cooperation with Moscow. The deployment of US and NATO forces in the region in autumn 2001 signified a serious shrinking of Russia’s influence but it invested considerable effort in recovering its position. A series of setbacks from spring 2004 to spring 2005 culminating in the ’orange revolution’ in Ukraine made this period a true annus horribilis for Russian foreign policy but the brutal crackdown on the uprising in Andijan, Uzbekistan in May 2005 was the turning point. It helped Russia to design a counter-revolutionary strategy according to which it would be ready to provide extensive support to the regimes that were ready to defend themselves with forceful means. In order to legitimize this support, Moscow decided to revive and strengthen several post-Soviet inter-state organizations that for many years had essentially been `paper structures’. Russia has achieved some success in instrumentalizing the counter-revolutionary momentum to advance its energy interests; in this sense, it certainly works much better than the tired counter-terrorism policy. Building on this success is going to be more difficult due to the pronounced anti-Western content of this strategy.

Energy is the most abundant and valuable natural resource of Central Asia and northwest China1 and includes oil, gas, coal, electricity, and renewables. Kazakhstan has large reserves of oil and coal. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have significant reserves of gas. Kyrgyzstan produces significant amounts of hydroelectric power. Xinjiang, China has significant coal resources and an uncertain, although generally promising, potential for oil in the Tarim basin. These energy reserves form the basis for future economic growth and development in the region, and energy exports are beginning to generate important foreign exchange revenues. Although Central Asia enjoys vast energy development potential, there are obstacles to exploiting these resources, including limited infrastructure for transporting energy—notably oil and gas pipelines and electric transmission lines—in the region, political turmoil, payment difficulties, and inadequate energy policies. Despite these challenges, however, with appropriate government planning Central Asia is poised to become a significant world supplier of energy, especially in the oil and gas sectors, and the region is likely to diminish OPEC’s influence of the global oil market over the long term.

This study examines the role of oil and gas in the making of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. It argues that Kazakhstan has been following a multi-vector foreign policy in relation to its oil-led development and the geopolitics of exporting oil from this landlocked region. The significance of geopolitical considerations and the resulting pragmatism of Kazakhstan’s leadership only allow a limited role for national identity and internal political dynamics in the making of its foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s geopolitical imperatives force the country to keep good relations with Russia and China as well as with the US and the EU, as counterbalancing partners.

This paper is dedicated to a better understanding of the oil and gas links between Central Asia and China and the sequential implications. The author’s message is threefold. 1. China’s growing economic momentum, coupled with its energy constraints, has led the country to search for overseas resources. Considering the fact that Central Asia enjoys prolific hydrocarbon resources, while China has huge energy demands, there is no doubt about the economic and geopolitical importance of Central Asian resources to China. What China needs to do now is to build a bridge to link these resources. The key rationale behind this is a regional energy linkage, which constitutes a new visionary way of handling input into China. 2. Considering the costs of the transportation infrastructure inside China and the comparison between the replacement costs of foreign and domestic oil, it makes sense for China to move westwards to maximise the benefits from Central Asia and other neighbouring regions. At the same time, China has to bear the huge cost of overseas expansion and high risk, both economically and geopolitically. 3. China cannot ignore the new “Great Game” played in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. All the major powers involved so far have their varying motivations and advantages to reap from their influence on the landlocked region. China, advantageously positioned on the border of Central Asia, sees an opportunity to broaden its geo-economic role in the region and beyond, so as to become a more important geopolitical force. At the turn of the century, China will give higher priority to market penetration and aggressive diplomacy. Further alliances and geopolitical goals in Central Asia, the Middle East and Russia will be explored. However, the benefits to China will depend on the effective management of uncertainties and the status of its geopolitical strength.

Russian energy behavior is examined with regard to the oil, electricity and gas sectors in each of the Central Asian states, and each state’s responses to that behavior. The contention is that the Central Asian states, in spite of disarray in the energy sectors, have attempted to develop strategies which treat energy as a strategically sensitive commodity, and account for Russia’s interests while protecting their own. The adaptive capacity of the Central Asian states varies from state to state - but also from sector to sector, and the article examines why that has been the case. The analysis concludes with an exploration of how Russia’s energy strategies in Central Asia may fit into the wider context of Russia’s market and political strategies.

Russian energy behavior is examined with regard to the oil, electricity and gas sectors in each of the Central Asian states, and each state’s responses to that behavior. The contention is that the Central Asian states, in spite of disarray in the energy sectors, have attempted to develop strategies which treat energy as a strategically sensitive commodity, and account for Russia’s interests while protecting their own. The adaptive capacity of the Central Asian states varies from state to state - but also from sector to sector, and the article examines why that has been the case. The analysis concludes with an exploration of how Russia’s energy strategies in Central Asia may fit into the wider context of Russia’s market and political strategies.

China’s involvement in Central Asia occupies an under-researched and emerging area of Chinese foreign policy, one which primarily revolves around its attempts to maintain regional stability in and around its periphery, strengthen its energy security in the region and maintain stable relations with the United States. Through its codominance with Russia of the nascent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it has and will likely continue to find cooperation with SCO member states over the former two issues, but will encounter some difficulty in finding cooperation regarding the latter. The PRC’s relations with Central Asia hold important short- and long-term implications for understanding the role of Xingjian in China’s foreign relations, China’s energy security and its relations with the US. Furthermore, Sino-Central Asian relations function as a proving ground for testing the viability of China’s grand strategy, effectively articulated by Avery Goldstein, in a specific foreign policy setting. Beijing’s Central Asian policies reflect its larger geopolitical strategy, meant to ensure its peaceful rise to regional prominence, assuage fears of a China threat and focus on domestic development. This study concludes that China’s relations with Central Asia meet vital national interests in regional stability, energy security and stable US-China relations, while achieving secondary benefits crucial to its grand strategy of a peaceful rise.

China’s involvement in Central Asia occupies an under-researched and emerging area of Chinese foreign policy, one which primarily revolves around its attempts to maintain regional stability in and around its periphery, strengthen its energy security in the region and maintain stable relations with the United States. Through its codominance with Russia of the nascent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it has and will likely continue to find cooperation with SCO member states over the former two issues, but will encounter some difficulty in finding cooperation regarding the latter. The PRC’s relations with Central Asia hold important short- and long-term implications for understanding the role of Xinjiang in China’s foreign relations, China’s energy security and its relations with the US. Furthermore, Sino-Central Asian relations function as a proving ground for testing the viability of China’s grand strategy, effectively articulated by Avery Goldstein, in a specific foreign policy setting. Beijing’s Central Asian policies reflect its larger geopolitical strategy, meant to ensure its peaceful rise to regional prominence, assuage fears of a China threat and focus on domestic development. This study concludes that China’s relations with Central Asia meet vital national interests in regional stability, energy security and stable US-China relations, while achieving secondary benefits crucial to its grand strategy of a peaceful rise.

ENERGY ISSUES IN ASIA

The past decade has brought remarkable changes to the economic cooperation of North-West Japan (Hokkaido and Japan Sea coastal prefectures) and the Russian Far East, such as fast growth of intra-regional trade, great structural changes, a huge increase in the number of cooperating companies and thousands of Russians coming to Japanese ports, which until recently were closed to them. Similar trends were observed in Asian, European and American regions involved in trade with Russia. In Japan, the initial “Siberian euphoria” has gradually been replaced by a much more realistic approach. The reason is that liberalization of trade, globalization and regional development created a number of problems: the prevalence of geo-political over economic considerations in energy projects, the growth of the shadow sector in certain arrears of mutual trade, the very uneven distribution of benefits and losses from cross-border cooperation and the deep differences of public opinion in Japan and Russia. This paper argues that in terms of public finance theory, these problems can be considered as examples of a failure of market mechanisms, shadow economy, negative externalities and asymmetric information, which can only be solved by effective public policy and state intervention.

  • Bradshaw, M., Prospects for oil and gas exports to Northeast Asia from Siberia and the Russian Far East, with a particular focus on Sakhalin, in “Sibirica: Journal of Siberian Studies”, Volume 3, Number 1, Number 1/April 2003, pp. 64-86(23). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

The spring of 2003 saw a number of key announcements relating to the Sakhalin oil and gas projects. After considerable speculation, the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company announced that it was to go ahead with a $10 billion investment to construct Russia’s first liquefied natural gas plant to export gas to Northeast Asia. This article examines the wider context of Russia’s potential as an oil and gas supplier to Northeast Asia. It considers the prospects for the numerous gas pipeline projects that are being proposed. It then focuses in detail on the prospects for oil and gas development offshore of Sakhalin. The background to the current projects is presented and the composition and current status of the major projects reviewed. The article then examines the processes that are helping to shape the projects and places Sakhalin with the wider debate of the impact of globalization upon Russia’s economic transformation. The paper concludes by assessing the prospects for the future.

This article responds to a plea for economic geographers to play greater attention to the world’s resource peripheries. The article presents a detailed case study of oil and gas development offshore of Sakhalin in the Russian Far East. The study serves to illustrate the complexity of resource peripheries and to demonstrate how a critical approach to resource geographies aids economic geographic theorization of globalization. The case study focuses on how the `greening’ of global project financing has created a means by which environmental non-governmental organizations hold the international oil companies to account. The article describes the transnational advocacy network that has developed to protest against the Sakhalin-II project. The key issues are identified and the response of the operator, Sakhalin Energy, is considered. Finally, the recent actions of the Russian Government in relation to the environmental impacts of the Sakhalin-II project are examined. The article concludes by assessing the ways in which the Sakhalin case demonstrates the complex processes that construct resource peripheries and how such analyses contribute to the development of a truly global economic geography.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has centralized decision making in Moscow and has reduced the role of domestic actors. He has demonstrated his own personal management of foreign policy in relation to China and Japan. He has used negotiations over oil and territory to place Russia in a more favourable position between them. In relation to oil, he has overruled the oil company Yukos and others within his own government and decided in favour of the Japanese pipeline route, which includes a branch line to China. Putin decided on the Japanese route because it promised access to wider markets in the Asia Pacific, besides China. It also entailed deeper Japanese involvement in Russia’s development and reduced Russian dependence upon China. In terms of territory, Putin undermined the power of local opposition and offered territorial settlements to both China and Japan, to remove sources of future tension. With China he compromised over the river islands which had been left outstanding since the main border agreement was signed in 1991. To Japan he again offered a compromise over the disputed islands based on the 1956 agreement to improve relations. Russians may hope that energy dependence would induce the Japanese to become more willing to compromise over the territorial issue. The Japanese, however, expect that Russia’s need for funding for the pipeline would allow them to resist that pressure and to demand a return of all disputed islands. If Russia emerges as an energy supplier to both China and Japan its influence and its regional role would be enhanced. Much depends upon the prospects for the oil pipeline and its branch line, whose feasibility has been questioned.

This article argues that 2003-4 were decisive years in Russo-Chinese relations. Uncertainties over Russia’s commitment to supply China with much needed energy revived deep-seated anxieties about the whole future of their relationship. However, by the autumn of 2004 they had launched plans for strengthening the partnership and widening mutual popular understanding. It also argues that this coincides with new efforts to view their foreign policies through the lens of constructivism, instead of realism. The article then looks at developments in bilateral economic relations and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, before adumbrating their wider advocacy of multilateralism, linking this to converging relations with India. Finally, it argues that relations with the US will continue to have a significant impact on the direction and closeness of this bilateral relationship. It is still a partnership rather than an alliance. Russia and China may sometimes put a higher priority on their relations with the West rather than on each other. Yet they are also looking at other potential emerging powers and how they can bend that process of emergence to their advantage.

The three major oil importing countries of Northeast Asia—China, Japan and South Korea—are concerned about future security of energy supplies to fuel their dynamic economic activity. Currently all three countries are highly dependent on imports of oil from the Middle East, a region with inherent political instability. Russia’s rich reserves of oil and gas in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East offer an obvious alternative. Given the geographical proximity of Russia and its desire to increase its energy exports to Northeast Asia, there is huge potential for cooperation. So far there has been no real intra-regional cooperation and no common external policy towards Russia. Despite obvious differences between Europe and North East Asia, the European model of energy cooperation, developed over the past 50 years, offers some useful lessons.

When significant changes take place in one part of the world, it is to be expected that effects will be felt elsewhere. Particularly in an era of increasing globalization, as regions and countries become inextricably linked to each other, what takes place in one region will be felt in another. This is clearly the case with the Greater Middle East (GME). As this region expands in scope and composition, those areas on the borders must deal with the consequences. For example, much attention is placed on European reactions to and relations with the GME. Whether it is it terms of energy transfers, European Union programs regarding a "dialogue with Islam," or NATO’s "Mediterranean Dialogue," there is a strong sense that Europeans must remain engaged with the region. However, can the same be said for states to the East particularly in the Far East? Is there a connection, and if so, how does this region relate to the GME? In short, why should someone examining the intricacies of state and societal development in the GME care about what takes place in the Russian Far East? There are several reasons that will be assessed in this article. First, the uncertainty of resource management and exploitation in the GME does mean that states in the Far East need to evaluate their own resource capabilities and needs. Developments within the GME necessitate a more thorough evaluation of what exists in the Far East for the countries in the region. Second, this sense of resource needs is in contrast to a political reality in the region: the major states have their own national security concerns located in other areas, thus creating a political and security "void." Russia, for example, gives higher priority to the West (Europe) and the South (Middle East). China remains committed to security concerns to the Southeast (Taiwan) and increasingly to the West (Central Asia and South Asia). Are the states in question devoting enough attention to the area that intersects them all? Third, if the states in the region believe that regional cooperation is important to address the first part above, the realities of the second part will most likely dampen any chance at true cooperation and regional development. How to overcome these problems and prevent the region from becoming a true "void" is the challenge of the states in the Far East today and in the future. A proper analysis of these security issues requires that one examine the perceptions held within the region, the capabilities and limitations of the respective governments, and an understanding of how these geopolitical differences have played out in the past.

China and Russia had comparable shares of world supply of and demand for energy in 1997 but this was the result of opposing trends. Despite dramatic decline in energy intensity, demand growth in China has exceeded supply growth in the 1990s by 1% per annum, leading to the first deficit in primary energy supply in 1997. This deficit is projected to reach 9% of total demand by 2010, forcing China to become a significant competitor for international energy resources. Energy demand in Russia fell 6% per annum 1991-96, only two-thirds of GDP decline but more than supply, indicating an increasing share of exports in production, with the change from inter-regional to international supply within the Former Soviet Union a further significant factor. Russia has no difficulty finding a market for its oil exports but these are projected to be lower than present levels by 2010. In gas, conversely, where it has a unique endowment, it is losing share in its established European markets, encouraging a turn to the world’s largest energy deficit region-the Asia Pacific Region. This article examines these comparative changes and the potential of energy to form the core of the emerging economic relationship between Russia and China.

Indigenous peoples of the Russian North, Siberia, and the Russian Far East are increasingly demanding that proponents of industrial projects carry out an etnologicheskaia ekspertiza (anthropological expert review or ethno-cultural impact assessment) of their project, in order to assess the socio-economic and cultural impacts on local and indigenous communities living close to project sites. However, there is a lack of an appropriate legislative framework in Russia, no established methodology, and a lack of understanding among stakeholders about what an etnologicheskaia ekspertiza is. The established Russian environmental impact assessment process (requiring a state ecological expert review of projects) does not include assessment of socio-economic and cultural impacts on communities. In this article the author discusses the concept of etnologicheskaia ekspertiza and the context that gave rise to it, shares her practical experience, and makes recommendations for establishing a legal framework for etnologicheskaia ekspertiza, with reference to comparable Western concepts, such as social and cultural impact assessment.

Russia has been deprived of the chance of becoming a major oil and gas supply source for the Northeast Asian region due to the combination of several factors, in particular by the absence of pipeline infrastructure in the area. Moscow made its first significant decision to construct an energy transportation infrastructure development by 2008, even though it is only the first stage of the 4,000 km long distance pipeline. If the development is made as planned, the Northeast Asian region is set to witness a massive crude oil flow from East Siberia and a sizable LNG export from the Sakhalin Islands before the end of this decade. The Moscow authority is supposed to make a final decision on the long distance natural gas pipeline before the end of 2005. If timing of the supply of pipeline gas to Bohai Bay areas is missed and consequently a massive LNG supply is arranged for North China, a significant delay of pipeline gas introduction to the Northeast Asian region will be inevitable and the price may have to be borne by the region’s LNG consumers.

The effect of the former Soviet Union crude oil exports on the Japanese VLCC market and its Middle East oil imports: Is near sourcing viable? Japan is a major net importer of ‘primary energy’. Although recent government policies have been directed towards diversifying the type and origin of procurement, she is still empowered, in the main, by Middle East Gulf crude oil supplies. Russia with ample export quantities of crude oil within 1000 km of Japan could provide an alternative ‘near source’. Is it viable? And if so, then what effect is it likely to have on the Japanese VLCC fleet? By a review of available material an overview is provided and explored in the context of Japan’s current oil policies and sourcing. Prospects for alternative sourcing are investigated and conclusions finally reached.

This article examines the concept of Eurasianism in relation to Russia’s East Asian policy from Yeltsin to Putin. It argues that there are three main interpretations of Russia’s Eurasianist identity in the foreign policy discourse regarding East Asia: Pragmatic Eurasianism, Neo-Eurasianism, and Intercivilisational Eurasianism. Each interpretation emphasizes a different aspect of Eurasianism with different policy implications. However, they all share an instrumentalist nature, of being used to justify Russia’s Great Power status and a greater role for it in East Asia. Moreover, it is the pragmatic and geoeconomic aspects of Russia’s Eurasianist identity that are being stressed most by the Putin administration, especially on energy and transport links.

For the indigenous peoples of northern Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far East, Sovietization and industrial development—including onshore oil and gas development from the 1920s have resulted in the loss of language, ethnic homogeneity, and the lands where they practice traditional livelihood activities. Multinational offshore oil and gas projects commenced in the late 1990s. Sakhalin’s indigenous people initially sought partnerships with the multinationals, but turned to protest in 2005, demanding among other things that companies complete an etnologicheskaia ekspertiza (anthropological expert review or ethno-cultural impact assessment). This is a relatively new Russian term and no methodological guidelines currently exist in Russian law. One of the offshore projects, the Sakhalin-2 Project, completed an international-style social impact assessment in 2003. The author compares this assessment and the World Bank social safeguard standards adopted by the Sakhalin-2 Project with the etnologicheskaia ekspertiza, arguing for the integration of Western and Russian approaches, in order to establish a sound scientific and legal basis for the assessment of socio-economic and cultural impacts of industrial projects on local communities.

The start of the construction of an oil export pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean marks an important new phase in Russia’s policy of diversifying its exports away from Europe. Sales to the former Comecon nations of Eastern Europe have been eroded over the last decade-and-a-half since the countries there have tried to import crude oil from the North Sea and elsewhere, following the collapse of the Soviet economic bloc with its barter system of trade in oil and major commodities. Recently, Western Europeans have expressed concerns about the share of Russian supplies in their energy balances, particularly since the argument between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies at the beginning of 2006 (see ’Gas and Power’, February 2006). Since then, the European Commission has been warning of the danger of the European Union’s becoming over-reliant on Russian energy.

The world natural gas markets are analysed, with a special focus on the countries of Northeast Asia (NEA). The natural gas demands of China, Japan and South Korea, until the year 2020, is projected, considering a possible share of Russian gas. The resource potential of natural gas from the Siberian platform and the Sakhalin shelf is given as a sound basis for fuelling Russia’s position in the natural gas market of NEA countries. Development of the powerful gas industry in the East of Russia faces some particular conditions that can decrease the effectiveness of investments. The eastern geopolitical direction is very important for Russia and the necessity to create a favourable political and economic environment for oil and gas export is of prime interest, as stressed in Energy Strategy for Russia till the Year 2020. In this context, the long-term market for natural gas in East Siberia and the Far East of Russia is investigated. Possible routes of natural gas export from Russia to NEA countries include three main directions: to the west of China with connection to the "West-East gas pipeline", a route through and/or round Mongolia and, finally, a route along the Trans-Siberian or Baikal-Amur railroads to Russian ports in the Far East. As a result of complex studies, three stages in the creation of the unified gas pipeline system are suggested. Evaluation of the investments required for construction of such a natural gas pipeline system, expected gas volumes and prices on the markets show its high economic efficiency. In conclusion, the most valuable ideas are stressed.

This article discusses significant changes in Russia and the surrounding world during the last several years. The author argues that these changes created major preconditions for the beginning of a new era in relations between Russia and Northeast Asian countries, which will boost a breakthrough in the field of energy cooperation and might add a “second wing” to the idea of regionalism in Northeast Asia.

This introduction provides an overview of academic research and current practice relating to stakeholder dialogue around oil and gas development in the Russian North, Siberia and the Russian Far East. We discuss the two main strands of analysis in this special issue: (a) regulation and impact assessment; and (b) relationship-building in practice, with a particular focus on indigenous communities. We argue that an effective regulatory framework, meaningful dialogue, and imaginative organization of stakeholder relations are required to minimize negative impacts and maximize benefits from oil and gas projects. Self-interest, mistrust, and a lack of collective agency frequently lead to ineffective planning and heightened tensions in relations. We identify lessons to be learned from partnerships and initiatives already established in Sakhalin and Western Siberia, despite the lack of a stable legal framework to govern relations. This issue focuses on the academic-practitioner interface, emphasizing the importance of practical application of academic research and the value of non-academic contributions to academic debates.

From an environmental perspective, electricity grid interconnections in Northeast Asia make sense. Cities in Northeast China, Mongolia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Republic of Korea (ROK) suffer from poor air quality due to the extensive use of coal-fired power generation. Rural communities suffer from a deficit of electricity, forcing reliance on coal and biofuels for cooking and heating in the home, which causes health-damaging indoor air pollution. Regional air pollution from acid rain and ozone is widespread. In addition, Japan is finding it hard to meet its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. Yet, just across their borders in far eastern Russia are extensive, clean energy resources: hydroelectricity and natural gas, and (potentially) nuclear power and tidal power. It would be environmentally beneficial to generate electricity cleanly in far eastern Russia and transmit the electricity across the borders into China, Mongolia, the DPRK, the ROK, and Japan, thereby displacing coal-fired electricity generation. We estimate that currently planned projects could alleviate the problems of two to five Chinese cities, with the potential for much larger benefits in the future.

CHINESE ENERGY POLICY

One of the most significant developments in the global energy market in the last several years has been China’s skyrocketing demand for energy. In 1993, China became a net oil importer for the first time in its history and in 2003 replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest oil importer (after the United States). The country needs more energy to maintain its spectacular economic performance. This study examines China’s attempts to satisfy its growing needs for oil and natural gas by increasing imports from Russia and Central Asia/Caspian Sea region. The analysis suggests that despite growing cooperation between the two sides, the Gulf region is likely to satisfy most of China’s hydrocarbons needs. Energy partnership between China and the Gulf has already started and is likely to be consolidated over the next few decades. The study also argues that this growing partnership between China and the Gulf should not be seen as a threat to any third party. The global energy market is well-integrated. Energy policy should not be seen in zero-sum terms. A China-Gulf partnership will benefit both sides and contribute to the stability of global energy markets.

China is commonly assumed to be seeking hegemony in its region. Yet China’s region involves it in relationships with major states with their own hegemonic or leadership interests—the US, Russia, Japan and India. This article examines each of China’s regional relationships in terms of the prime interests of China’s foreign policy framework. It concludes that it is important to distinguish between hegemonic capabilities and intentions: that while China will want to extend its influence as a regional power, its capability to do that will continue to grow in each of its subregions, its ability to exercise that power and influence will be limited. In the past its efforts have been largely to seek secure borders and economic opportunities and that for some years those objectives, together with energy security, are likely to remain the priority.

China is now the world’s second largest oil consuming nation. China’s external quest for oil has thus generated much attention and is believed by many to destabilize the world order. This article attempts to provide an overview of China’s external initiatives for satisfying domestic oil demands and to examine the implications of China’s oil diplomacy on regional and global political stability. The article suggests that China has taken three steps to satisfy its growing domestic demand for oil - expanding overseas oil supplies from the Middle East, diversifying its importing sources by reaching out to Africa, Russia, Central Asia and the Americas, and securing oil transport routes. This article argues that China’s oil diplomacy strengthens its ties with oil-producing nations and complicates those with oil-importing nations. Nevertheless, contrary to pessimistic predictions, China’s oil diplomacy has neither upset the USA’s fundamental policies towards Iraq and Iran, nor has it generated armed clashes in the South China Sea. China has largely accommodated the USA in these areas and has forged joint efforts in energy exploration with its Asian neighbours, except for Japan. China’s benign oil diplomacy can be explained by the minor role of oil imports in its energy consumption and, more importantly, by China’s peaceful-rise strategy.

Related items
Read:

ENERGY ISSUES IN AFRICA

Despite small domestic markets and rising costs of construction, several African countries are planning new refineries. Many are in oil-producing countries like Algeria and Nigeria, which already have extensive refinery networks, but some new players are emerging, including Ghana and Mauritania.

High rent creates contests for its capture that, unless skillfully managed, degrade political institutions and distort the economy, leading to a collapse of growth if unreformed. Mauritania’s projected oil stream risks such an outcome because past rent-driven growth has left a legacy of Dutch disease effects, rent-seeking and dependent social capital. This article proposes a dual-track strategy for deploying the oil rent as a politically practical means of managing social tensions and improving the economic outcome. Track one promotes a dynamic market economy in the hitherto neglected rural areas, while track two gradually reforms the rent-driven urban sector, thus postponing confrontation with established rent-seekers while the dynamic sector drives competitive diversification of the economy and builds a pro-reform political constituency.

On 1 January 2007, the Republic of Angola officially joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Luanda’s accession is the first change in the organization’s membership in more than three decades. This significant development demonstrates Africa’s growing contribution to the overall global energy security. This study examines the oil outlook of the major producers in the continent: Nigeria, Angola and Sudan. It also analyses the growing interdependence between major oil consuming nations (the United States, China and the European Union) and African producers. The contention is that increasing production from Africa and consolidating partnership with OPEC Members will contribute to global energy security and further enhance cooperation between producers and consumers.

This paper examines foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region, and attempts to identify their possible explanatory determinants. Nineteen countries are sampled for an 11-year period (1990 2000), and then we present an overview of the relationship between these foreign inflows and gross fixed capital formation (domestic investment) of MENA countries. Our test findings show that the previous year’s FDI, country openness, return on investment, membership of the World Trade Organisation, and being an oil-exporting country are all valuable predictors of country FDI inflows, and this relationship has been positive in the 1990 2000 period. These results, however, were found to be time-dependent as some variables were significant in the first sub-period 1990 1995, while other variables were significant in the 1996 2000 sub-period.

At a time when oil and gas production is declining in most areas outside the Persian Gulf, North Africa has a number of countries planning to increase their production. In this, the first part of a survey of the region, OET examines the prospects for Egypt and Tunisia. The second part of the survey will appear in next month’s OET.

Following last month’s survey of oil and gas production in Egypt and Tunisia, OET examines the outlook for Algeria and Libya.

It has been suggested that Africa is experiencing a `New Scramble’ thanks primarily to its oil and gas wealth, with the United States and the People’s Republic of China actively competing for access to Africa’s resources. This article aims to scrutinize the claim that Africa is facing a New Scramble, analysing the nature of the economic and political changes at work, the importance of Africa’s oil, and the political and economic forces behind the new oil rush. The article starts with an overview of the phenomenon labelled by some as the `New Scramble’. The main body of the article evaluates the existence of a New Scramble from three subject perspectives: history, international relations, and business studies. Finally, by analysing the likely impact on the economies of oil-producing states, it considers whether we should dismay or rejoice over the `New Scramble for Africa’. It concludes that the existence of a New Scramble or a US-Chinese race for Africa should be treated with some caution and that the use of terms such as `scramble’ and `race’ is perhaps misleading, while the economic impact of oil investments is likely to be bleak.

Popular perceptions of corruption, poverty and the `resource curse’ in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea can be caricatured as belonging to (or falling between) two possible positions. First, the fault lies with oil companies, exploiting, bribing and otherwise abusing innocent Africans. Second, the blame lies with corrupt African rulers, stealing the oil money. There is truth in each position, but this is now a stale, unhelpful debate, obscuring other aspects of the problem. Several themes merit more attention. First, taxation in resource-dependent states is different from what is found in other types of economy. Second, transparency and anti-corruption schemes like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative focus on revenue flows inside countries, ignoring crucially important transnational flows. Third, natural resources provoke competition and factional politics, fragmenting the public interest. These three lead to a fourth way of conceptualizing the issue-as a systemic one, which is not ultimately the result of bad behaviour (or even of `culture’). We should move away from focusing too much on actors and behaviour and instead focus on systems and processes, a shift that will result in different (or additional) policy prescriptions, new (or expanded) branches of economics and political science. This article does not depend on statistical analysis but instead takes a bottom-up view, based on nearly 15 years’ research into oil and politics in sub-Saharan Africa, including interviews with numerous key players, to explore the dynamics of the resource curse.

Related items
Read:

Maps :

ENERGY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS

  • Bakhtiari, A.M. Samsam, The price of natural gas, in “OPEC Review”, Volume 25, Number 4, December 2001, pp. 357-368(12). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    Natural gas used to be a relatively Cheap primary energy source, always at a discount to crude oil (on a comparative British thermal unit basis). It gradually evolved into a major resource during the 20th century — reaching a 24 per cent share of global primary energy in 1999. In the year 2000, natural gas prices in the USA rose to unheard-of highs of $10/million Btu, ushering in a new era, with natural gas at a 120 per cent premium to crude oil. This clearly was a watershed for gas, somehow similar to the 1973-74 watershed for oil prices. And similarly, any return to the status quo-ante looks rather improbable, although a number of experts (alongside the International Energy Agency) still believe the 2000 price `spike’ to have been “only transitory”. The consequences of higher gas prices (at a level equal to crude oil prices on a Btu basis) will be multifaceted and momentous, altering habits and uses in downstream industries and economic sectors, as well as providing added income for major gas-exporters, such as Russia, Canada and Algeria. Another potential consequence of the 2000 watershed might be to propel US standard prices (such as the `Henry Hub’ spot) to international status and gas price-setter, as the `WTI spot’ became an “international benchmark” for crude oils in the post-1993 era.For the time being, the equality of gas and oil prices has become the new norm; but, in the longer term, a discount of crude oil relative to natural gas might be envisaged, as the latter is a cleaner fuel and emits less carbon dioxide when used.
  • Goltsov, V.A., Veziroglu, T.N., A step on the road to Hydrogen Civilization, in “International Journal of Hydrogen Energy”, Volume 27, Number 7, July 2002, pp. 719-723(5).

    The Third International Conference “Hydrogen Treatment of Materials” (HTM-2001), Donetsk, May 14–18, 2001 was the first international hydrogen meeting held under the effect of a new conception “From a Hydrogen Economy to a Hydrogen Civilization”, which was first developed by V.A. Goltsov and T.N. Veziroglu. That was a meeting of the representatives of three subcommunities of the world hydrogen movements: the hydrogen energy subcommunity, the hydrogen-materials subcommunities and the subcommunity of industrialists ensuring safety and efficiency of hydrogen use in terms of the up-to-date industry. More than 130 members from 60 organizations in the USA, Great Britain, Spain, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Libya and Japan took part in the conference. Such a participation let the conference cover the achievements of hydrogen economy, hydrogen treatment of materials, and global subjects of a transition to Hydrogen Civilization of the future. At the final plenary meeting, the participants discussed and adopted the memorandum calling upon the world community, peoples and states to unite their efforts and to contribute with all the expertise attained to the transition of the humankind to the era of Hydrogen Civilization.
  • Gümrah, F., Katircioglu, D., Aykan, Y., Okumus, S., Kilinçer, N., Modeling of Gas Demand Using Degree-Day Concept: Case Study for Ankara, in “Energy Sources", Volume 23, Number 2, 1 February 2001, pp. 101-114(14). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    The demand for natural gas is rapidly increasing in Turkey, as it is in the rest of the world. However, natural gas reserves and production are rather limited in Turkey. The bulk of the Turkish gas demand is met by imports. Russia currently accounts for 69% of Turkey’s gas supplies. Physical shortages might occur; supplies for industrial production and household consumption could temporarily run short. Also, fluctuations in consumption might occur due to climatic reasons or peak daily industrial energy demand. Underground gas storage is a necessity in order to regulate these seasonal, daily, and hourly fluctuations. In order to effectively design and utilize underground gas storage, it is necessary to identify the market requirements. In this study, Ankara was chosen as a pilot region due to its strategic importance of being the capital city of Turkey, and a wide range of marketing surveys for the last seven years was performed. All of the factors influencing the gas consumption and the relationships between these factors were analyzed. How does gas demand behave in extremely cold weather? How does the industrial part of the city act in the consumption behavior? What are the plans of the Municipality of Ankara, responsible for the execution of the natural gas distribution project in Ankara? A model was developed based on degree-day (DD) concept, including the annual number of customers, average DDs, and the usage per customer. A history matching study was performed to verify the results of the model with the measured consumption data for the last seven years. Comparisons showed that the calculated consumption by DD model and measured daily consumption were in good agreement. Finally, by using the developed approach, the gas demand was forecasted for Ankara up to 2005. The results of this study can be used to design underground gas storage facility near Ankara.
  • International Energy Agency (IEA), Natural Gas Market Review 2007: Security in a Globalising Market to 2015, SourceOCDE Energie, Volume 2007, Number 1, May 2007.

    Over recent decades, natural gas has been an important element of secure, affordable, and environmentally responsible energy supply. But as production from IEA member countries declines, supplies will have to come from sources in more distant regions. What aspects of OECD gas markets need to be improved to deliver greater security and efficiency? What are the risks of increasing reliance on imports from Russia and the Middle East? Are strategic stocks of natural gas - similar to emergency oil stocks - a viable safety net to a supply disruption? Will there be enough investment in pipeline gas or will more need to be spent on LNG? What are the impacts of gas security on oil markets and power generation security? What do changes in the LNG industry mean for traditional contract terms? The Natural Gas Market Review 2007, the second issue in a new IEA publications series, addresses key questions in this dynamic market. It offers a global appraisal of current trends in the light of the most recent historical data, including supply and demand projections to 2015.
  • Ponomarev-Stepnoi, N., Nuclear power of the 21st century, in “Nuclear Engineering and Design”, Volume 173, Number 1, 2 October 1997, pp. 21-31(11).

    In the period after the F-1 start-up in Russia, tens of nuclear systems for different applications have been designed, built, tested, and put into operation. To satisfy a predicted growth of energy consumption, a competitive development of different power sources will be required. In the first half of the 21st century, natural gas will dominate over other power sources. But even this ‘gas bridge’ will pass through its maximum around the middle of the 21st century. The principle advantages of nuclear power, such as unlimited fuel resources, compactness of wastes, and freedom from combustion products discharge, contributes to its competitiveness. If nuclear power is to be a substitute for organic fuel, nuclear fuel breeding and reprocessing is imperative. The beginning of the 21st century, along with traditional operations, will be characterized by the use in reactors of a surplus of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium. In further nuclear power development and scaling up, its structuring will be impossible without considering the capabilities of different reactor types. In Russia, an increase in the utilization of reactor heat for district heating, as well as in the use of low power autonomous nuclear sources, are in sight. In the coming decades, the designs of the NPP under construction will use technical solutions that have already been proven by practice. At the same time, it is absolutely necessary to continue with exploratory research and development of revolutionary reactor designs of the next generation to cope with the problems of large-scale power engineering.
  • Ponomarev-Stepnoi, N.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Gagarinskii, A.Y., Moniz, E.J., Gottemoeller, R., Poneman, D., The Future of Nuclear Power: Energy, Ecology, and Safety, in “Atomic Energy”, Volume 93, Number 5, November 2002, pp. 855-865(11). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnect website.

    The results are presented of a bilateral meeting of Russian and US experts on “The future of nuclear power: energy, ecology, and safety” held on July 22–24, 2002 in Moscow. The subject of discussion was the question of how the US and Russia can provide for a future where nuclear energy will support economic growth, improve living conditions, protect the environment, and ensure nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Several positive points concerning nuclear fuel cycle which emerged and which encourage a reexamination of the future of nuclear power are noted. It is suggested that a four- or fivefold increase by the middle of this century in the production of nuclear energy be considered and discussed as a problem which is important enough to have a global effect on electricity production, energy safety, and mitigation of the greenhouse effect. A prediction is made for the development of global nuclear power in the 21st century. Specific directions of Russian–American collaboration are proposed without setting priorities. The factors that could effectuate successful collaboration are determined.
  • Rasskazchikova, T.V., Kapustin, V.M., Karpov, S.A., Ethanol as High–Octane Additive to Automotive Gasolines. Production and Use in Russia and Abroad, in “Chemistry and Technology of Fuels and Oils”, Volume 40, Number 4, July 2004, pp. 203-210(8). Available for purchase also on IngentaConnecta website.

    Stiffening of environmental regulations, growth of the motor fleet (basically due to automobiles running on high–octane gasolines), and the reduction in crude oil production and refining volumes are increasing fuel quality requirements. A priority direction in the evolution of the fuel–energy complex is to increase the share of high–octane gasolines in the total volume of fuels for engines with forced injection.

Reply to this article


Any message or comment?

  • (To create paragraphs, you simply leave blank lines.)

Who are you? (optional)

Focus on Venezuela

South Africa 2010

Energy in the 21st century: risks, challenges, perspectives

Cristiano Francese

Laurea magistrale in Economia e Politica dell’Unione Europea at the Facoltà di Scienze Politiche "Roberto Ruffilli" (Forlì), Bologna University. MSc in Energy Studies, specialisation in Energy Finance, University of Dundee, Scotland.


CC by-nc-nd

This licence applies to non-profit entities or organizations. Commercial organizations and anyone interested in using our materials for commercial purposes have to contact Mapping the World.

Con il contributo di:

Bologna International Committee for the Cartography and the Analyses of Contemporary World

Site Map | Help | Who we are | Contacts | Syndicate the whole site : RSS 2.0
Site created with SPIP (template) Login