The foreign energy policy of the United States is governed by three inescapable constraints: first, a heavy reliance on petroleum as the nation’s leading source of energy; second, a growing reliance on imported oil to supply the needed petroleum; and third, a shift in the center of gravity of world oil production from the global North to the global South, especially the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Together, these three constraints – each building on the other – have made the pursuit of foreign energy supplies a major concern of American foreign policy and led inexorably to greater reliance on the use of military force to ensure uninterrupted access to these supplies [1].

At present, the United States relies on petroleum for approximately 41 percent of its total energy supply, compared to 23 percent for both coal and natural gas, its other two major sources of energy. Projections by the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) suggest, moreover, that oil will retain its dominant role in the U.S. energy mix for years to come: Although natural gas and renewables like solar and wind power will gain a slightly larger share of the total by 2030, oil is still expected to remain the dominant source of the nation’s net energy, with an estimated 40 percent share in that year [2].

Petroleum has come to play such a dominant role in America’s energy mix because of its great versatility as an energy source and its ease of transportation. Oil can be used to generate electricity, to heat buildings, and to serve as a feedstock for an immense variety of chemical derivatives, including lubricants, pesticides, paints, plastics, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, artificial fibers, among others. But it is in its role as a transportation fuel that oil has become most important: Petroleum products now supply approximately 97 percent of all transportation energy in the United States, propelling the overwhelming majority of all moving vehicles. Of the 20.6 million barrels of oil consumed daily in the United States in 2006, some 14.6 million barrels, or 71 percent, were devoted to transportation use [3]. Without a steady supply of these petroleum products, the American economy would simply grind to a halt.

Oil is also essential to American military power. Although U.S. military leaders like to brag about the lethality of U.S. precision-guided munitions and the growing sophistication of space-based systems, the fact is that U.S. military still relies on oil-powered vehicles to transport troops and equipment to the battlefield, keep them supplied with ammunition and spare parts, deliver munitions on the enemy. And because the United States is the only nation with a global military presence – maintaining bases or missions on six continents and fleets on most of the world’s oceans – its military establishment has a gargantuan requirement for energy, making it the world’s largest single consumer of petroleum.

America’s overall reliance on petroleum as a source of energy began after World War II, when the country’s “love affair with the automobile” – as it is often described – began in earnest. With factories converting from war production to civilian output and millions of workers now able to afford the down payment on a Ford or Chevrolet, car ownership became de rigueur for the ordinary American household. This expansion in automobile ownership was accompanied by the construction of the nation’s Interstate Highway System and a mass exodus to the suburbs, further increasing America’s demand for petroleum products. According to the DoE, total U.S. oil consumption jumped from 6.5 million barrels per day in 1950 to 9.8 million in 1960, 14.7 million in 1970, and 17.1 million in 1980 [4].

At first, this vast surge in petroleum consumption was facilitated by a parallel increase in domestic U.S. oil output. When Americans began buying cars in vast numbers and moving to the suburbs, the United States was the world’s leading oil producer and its homegrown energy firms were able to supply most of the nation’s requirements. Production from wells in the Lower 48 States rose from 5.4 million barrels per day in 1950 to 9.4 million barrels in 1970, providing the bulk of domestic supplies and helping to keep energy prices low. But unbeknownst to most Americans, a dramatic change in the basic energy equation occurred in 1970, when production in the Lower 48 stopped growing. Although discoveries in Alaska have added some additional crude oil to domestic U.S. petroleum supplies since then, the nation’s net output has otherwise declined every year since 1971 and now stands at only 4.4 million barrels per day, a mere 47 percent of what it was in the peak year of 1970 [5].

But while domestic output has declined, that love affair with the automobile has shown no signs of fatigue, and so U.S. demand for petroleum has continued to grow year after year. And with domestic supplies in ever diminishing supply, the United States had no choice but to rely increasingly on imports. The nation’s reliance on foreign oil as a share of total supply jumped from 21.5 percent in 1970 to 37.3 percent in 1980 and 42.1 percent in 1990, finally crossing the symbolically important threshold of 50 percent in 1998. Since then, U.S. dependence on imports has continued to rise, reaching 60 percent in 2006, the last year for which the DoE has provided such a figure [6].

The steady increase in U.S. reliance on imported petroleum has obvious implications for American foreign policy, given the critical importance of petroleum products to the national economy. Any significant contraction in the flow of foreign oil to the United States would have immediate and devastating consequences for the health of the economy – a critical vulnerability that was brought home with traumatic impact by the “oil shocks” of 1973-74 (caused by the Arab oil embargo of the United States and the Netherlands) and 1979 (precipitated by the Islamic Revolution in Iran). For this reason, American leaders have generally preferred to secure the bulk of America’s petroleum imports from neighboring countries in the Western Hemisphere – notably Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela – and from friendly nations elsewhere, especially the North Sea countries and those Middle Eastern supplies (like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) that are under American military protection.

But many of the countries from which the United States has long obtained much of its oil supplies are at or near their own peak in production, and so will not be able to keep increasing their exports of oil to the United States in the future. This means that this country will be forced to rely increasingly on less friendly suppliers, or to countries far removed from its traditional security umbrella, such as the nations of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin. Herein lies a great foreign policy and military challenge for the United States.

To appreciate the magnitude of this challenge, it is necessary to consider the shift taking place in the locus of world oil production. Originally, the center of gravity of world oil production was located in the global North – the United States, Canada, Europe, the Tsarist/Soviet empire, and their immediate neighbors, including Mexico. This is hardly surprising, since resource producers always gravitate toward those reserves that are close at hand and easy to extract. Even in the 1950s, two-thirds of world production was concentrated in the global North. But precisely because these reserves were developed earliest in the grand history of global petroleum extraction, they are also among the first to approach full depletion. As this occurs, energy consumers are coming to rely increasingly on reserves in the global South: notably in the Middle East, Africa, and the Caspian Sea basin. Because these deposits were developed later in the historical cycle of extraction, they have not yet reached peak output and so are capable of providing increased supplies in the years ahead. At present, the global South accounts for approximately two-thirds of global oil output – a complete reversal of the situation in 1950 – and will account for three-quarters by 2030, if not sooner [7].

Within the global South, moreover, only a handful of states will be capable of substantially boosting their petroleum output in the years ahead, thereby satisfying the ever-growing thirst of the United States and other thirsty consumers, like China and India. For the most part, this exclusive group is limited to Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela, plus one or two others.

This shift in the locus of world oil production poses an excruciating dilemma for the United States, in that many of the countries on which the United States will be forced to rely in this new era are corrupt, unfriendly, unsafe, or divided along ethnic and religious lines. Most of them are predominantly Muslim or, like Nigeria and Sudan, have large Muslim populations. Even those that are not at war themselves, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are located in dangerous war zones that encompass a constant threat to the safe delivery of oil to the United States. Corruption and political discord are endemic in most of these states, and terrorist or insurgent groups operate in many of them – often targeting pipelines and other oil infrastructure in their struggles against the central government or Western companies. Conflict and disorder, then, are a constant background characteristic of oil production and export in virtually all of these areas.

The U.S. Response

In response to this dilemma, American policymakers have adopted a three-pronged strategy: first, they have established a “special relationship” with Saudi Arabia and other friendly Persian Gulf petro-states, entailing U.S. military protection in return for assured access to crude petroleum; second, they have stressed the “diversification” of U.S. energy imports, so as to minimize America’s exposure to risk of disruption in supply from any one producing area; and third, they have extended the same sort of military aid and protection to these other suppliers as has long been provided to key Persian Gulf producers.

The “special relationship” with Saudi Arabia and the policy of extending a military umbrella over key U.S. suppliers in the Persian Gulf area can be traced back to the final years of World War II, when U.S. leaders first became concerned about the prospect of an eventual peak in domestic production and so perceived a need to acquire a secure foreign source of supply. With this in mind, President Franklin D. Roosevelt arranged a meeting with King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi dynasty, aboard an American warship, the U.S.S. Quincy, while it was anchored at the entrance to the Nile Canal on February 14, 1945. No official record was kept of this famous encounter, but most scholars and policymakers have concluded that two leaders agreed to establish an informal alliance under which the United States would assume permanent responsibility for protecting the House of Saud against its foreign and domestic enemies in return for exclusive U.S. access to Saudi oil [8]. Certainly, senior American officials have repeatedly referred to this meeting as the basis for U.S. military ties with the kingdom. As noted by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, these ties hark back with respect to Saudi Arabia to 1945, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz on the U.S.S. Quincy, toward the end of World War II, and affirmed at that time that the United States has a lasting and a continuing interest in the security of the kingdom [9].

In line with this arrangement, the United States undertook a variety of measures aimed at providing a defensive shield around Saudi Arabia and its oil fields. These included the establishment of a military base at Dhahran (beginning in 1946), the supply of U.S. arms to Saudi forces, and the deployment of hundreds (later thousands) of American military instructors and advisers in the kingdom [10]. However, U.S. officials initially preferred to rely on Great Britain – for decades the dominant power in the region – to assume primary responsibility for regional security. But when London announced that it could no longer perform this role and would remove its forces from the area by the end of 1971, Washington chose to confer responsibility for regional stability on the shah of Iran, then America’s principal ally in the Gulf. This approach – known at the time as the “surrogate doctrine” – prevailed until January 1979, when the shah was overthrown and replaced by radical Islamic clerics loyal to the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini.

The rise of Khomeini, followed ten months later by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (placing Soviet troops only 300 miles from the strategic Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf), produced panic in Washington and led to a thorough review of U.S. policy. No longer willing to rely on surrogates like the now-deposed Shah of Iran, President Jimmy Carter and his top aides adopted what has since been called the “Carter Doctrine”, entailing direct U.S. military responsibility for protection of Middle Eastern oil supplies. Let our position be absolutely clear, Carter told a Joint Session of Congress on January 23, 1980: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force [11]. To lend credibility to his proclamation, Carter announced a number of military moves aimed at beefing up America’s capacity to employ force in the Persian Gulf and surrounding areas. The most important of these was the activation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), a new multi-service combat group with responsibility for all U.S. military operations in the greater Gulf region, along with the acquisition of new bases in the Gulf and Indian Ocean areas [12].

Although critical of President Carter on many issues, President Ronald Reagan wholeheartedly endorsed the Carter Doctrine and lent it fresh impetus. On January 1, 1983, he elevated the RDJTF to a full-scale regional headquarters organization – the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) – granting it equal status with the existing European Command (EURCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Nor was the establishment of CENTOCOM Reagan’s only expression of support for the Carter Doctrine: He also invoked that policy in response to actual developments in the Gulf. When, at the height of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, Iranian forces began to attack Kuwaiti oil tankers while traveling through the Persian Gulf – presumably to discourage Kuwait from providing loans to Iraq for arms procurement – Reagan authorized the “reflagging” of Kuwaiti tankers with the American ensign and their protection by U.S. naval forces. Such action was essential, Reagan declared, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the flow of oil through the Gulf [13].

The Carter Doctrine was next invoked by President George H. W. Bush in August 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and posed what appeared to be a threat to Saudi Arabia and its oil exports to the United States. Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence, and so the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States, he told a nationwide television audience on August 8, when announcing the deployment of U.S. troops to the Kingdom [14]. Only later, when American troops were girding for combat with the Iraqis, did administration officials offer other justifications for war – the need to liberate Kuwait, to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to bolster international sanctions against aggression, and so on. The record makes it clear, however, that the President and his senior associates initially viewed the invasion of Kuwait through the lens of the Carter Doctrine: as a threat to Saudi Arabia and the free flow of oil from the Gulf [15].

The defense of Saudi Arabia against possible Iraqi attack (Operation Desert Shield) eventually gave way to the military campaign to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm). Once this had been accomplished, however, Bush senior balked at invading Iraq itself, fearing a prolonged war and the disintegration of the international coalition he had so carefully assembled. Instead, Bush initiated – and President Bill Clinton later perpetuated – the “containment” of Saddam, entailing a naval quarantine, the “no fly” zones over northern and southern Iraq, and a punishing system of economic sanctions. As noted by Bush senior and Clinton at the time, containment was intended to trigger “regime change” in Iraq by making conditions so onerous that Iraqi elites would overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. By 2001, however, it had become evident that the strategy was having the opposite effect: instead of turning the Iraqi public against the regime, the sanctions were enhancing Hussein’s stature as a vigorous opponent of American imperialism. And despite the terrible drubbing they received during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi forces were still seen as a threat to U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf. It was to protect these interests against any future Iraqi assault that President George W. Bush elected to commence the invasion of Iraq, viewing such action as the only plausible option for removing Hussein once and for all. Whatever the reasons given at the time, the 2003 invasion of Iraq can thus best be understood as a continuation of the January-February 1991 assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait – an assault that was prompted, in the first instance, by the perceived threat to America’s “vital interests” in the Persian Gulf, as originally articulated by President Carter on January 23, 1980 [16].

At present, the Pentagon’s top priority in the Persian Gulf area is to defeat the anti-American insurgency in Iraq and to establish some degree of order in Baghdad. But, consistent with its historic mission, the U.S. Central Command is also protecting pipelines, refineries, and oil-export facilities throughout Iraq. Although this effort has received far less media attention than the urban warfare in Baghdad and other key cities, it is no less important: with petroleum constituting the nation’s only significant source of export income, ensuring uninterrupted oil exports is essential for the economic survival of Iraq’s U.S.-backed central government. Indeed, protection of key oil-export facilities is considered a primary motivation for the U.S. military’s indefinite occupation of selected bases in Iraq and the establishment of a new naval “command-and-control” facility at a Basra oil-loading platform [17].

Looking ahead, CENTCOM is also deeply concerned about the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran to U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf. The Bush administration has repeatedly charged that the Iranians seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and has insisted that a nuclear-armed Iran would constitute an intolerable threat to American security interests. Even without nuclear weapons, Iranian forces are said to pose a potential threat to the safe passage of oil tankers through the vital Strait of Hormuz. During a visit to the Gulf in the spring of 2007, Vice President Dick Cheney warned Tehran that the United States would take whatever action was necessary to prevent this from happening. We’ll keep the sea lanes open. We’ll stand with our friends in opposing extremism and strategic threats…. [And] we’ll stand with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region [18].

Diversification

The second key aspect of America’s foreign energy policy is diversification, or the maximization of the number of oil producers on which the United States relies for its imports of oil – thus reducing its vulnerability to a supply disruption from any one of them. This policy reflects a fear that over-reliance on the Persian Gulf – no matter how hard the United States works to protect the flow of oil from that region – could expose this country to periodic “oil shocks” (like those of 1973-74 and 1979) as a result of the Gulf’s chronic instability.

President Clinton, the first U.S. leader to embrace this policy, initially sought to enhance energy diversification by establishing economic, political, and military ties with the newly-independent oil producers of the Caspian Sea basin, notably Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Clinton and his top aides, including Vice President Albert Gore, worked hard to persuade the leaders of these states to allow American companies to play a key role in the development of their vast oil and natural gas deposits. The White also threw its support behind construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a new oil conduit intended to transport oil from the Caspian to the Mediterranean via Georgia without passing through Russia or Iran – a key strategic objective of the United States. This policy was subsequently adopted by President George W. Bush, who extended it to Africa and other areas of the global South [19].

The strategy of diversification as embraced by the Bush administration was officially embedded in the National Energy Policy (NEP), released by the White House on May 17, 2001. Widely known as the “Cheney report” after its principal author, Vice President Dick Cheney, the NEP calls for a substantial increase in U.S. oil imports in order to satisfy soaring demand for basic energy. Much of this imported oil is to come from the Persian Gulf area – but, in recognition of the chronic turmoil in the Gulf, the plan also calls for a significant increase in U.S. reliance on emerging producers in other areas of the world, notably the Caspian Sea basin, West Africa, and South America [20]. Middle East oil production will remain central to world oil security, the report notes. However, concentration of world oil production in any one region of the world is a potential contributor to market instability, and so greater diversity of oil production . . . has obvious benefits to all market participants [21].

In line with this policy, the Cheney report calls on U.S. leaders, including the president, the secretaries of state, energy, and commerce, and their senior deputies, to travel to countries in promising oil-producing areas to increase their exports to the United States and to open the door to greater participation by American energy companies. In Africa, for example, the three key secretaries are enjoined by the NEP to meet with their regional counterparts to promote a more captive environment for U.S. oil and gas trade, investment, and operations; [and] to promote geographic diversification of energy supplies, addressing such issues as transparency, sanctity of contracts, and security [22].

But while diversification can spread the risk of exposure to disruptions in the delivery of foreign oil supplies, it cannot eliminate the problem of reliance on inherently unstable producers. This is so because virtually all of the countries identified as potential alternatives to the leading Persian Gulf suppliers are no less immune to the sort of dangers long present in that area.

Why is this so? Part of the answer to this question lies in the fact that these countries, like many of the producers in the Gulf, bear significant scars from the colonial era. In many cases, their original social structures were severely battered and traumatized by the occupying powers and so the governments erected in the post-colonial era have proved susceptible to corruption, cronyism, and ethnic favoritism. Many of these countries, moreover, encompass ethnic enclaves that were incorporated into the original colonial territory at the behest of the imperial powers and thus found themselves in post-independence states with which they have little or nothing in common – often leading to the outbreak of separatist movements or violent drives for regional autonomy. These include, for example, Cabinda province in Angola, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the Aceh region of Indonesia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish areas of Iraq. At the same time, many groups within these countries continue to harbor strong anti-imperial sentiments and so resent any contemporary intrusion into their societies of Western culture and commerce.

What this means, in the final analysis, is that increased U.S. reliance on oil from Africa, Latin America, and the Caspian region is certain to entail the same sort of geopolitical risks as have long been evident in the Persian Gulf area. And it is this reality that has driven the Bush administration to apply the Carter Doctrine to these areas and extend the same sort of military umbrella to them as has long been provided to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other members of the Saudi-backed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

As noted, this process commenced during the final years of the Clinton administration, when military ties were established with the post-Soviet states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. President George W. Bush – who had been highly critical of his predecessor’s other foreign policy efforts – was quick to embrace his initiatives in the Caspian basin. Under Bush, U.S. military aid to friendly states in the region was increased and the tempo of military-to-military contacts and joint exercises stepped up. These efforts were well under way prior to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, but were accelerated significantly in the months that followed. In announcing these moves, the White House has repeatedly stated that such action is needed to fight Al Qaeda and to support ongoing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. But a careful reading of Pentagon and State Department documents suggests that the protection of oil is of paramount concern. Thus, in requesting $51.2 million in economic assistance to Azerbaijan for fiscal year 2005, the Bush administration affirmed that U.S. national interests in Azerbaijan center on the strong bilateral security and counter-terrorism cooperation [and] the advancement of U.S. energy security. It further noted that the involvement of U.S. firms in the development and export of Azerbaijani oil is key to our objective of diversifying world oil supplies. In line with this reasoning, the Department of Defense is helping Azerbaijan to develop and deploy a small navy in its oil-rich Caspian Sea enclave, whose outer boundaries have been contested by Iran and Turkmenistan [23].

Meanwhile, in Kazakhstan, the United States is helping to refurbish an old Soviet air base at Atyrau, near the giant offshore Kashagan oil field, which is partly owned by Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips, and Royal Dutch/Shell. This base will be used to house a Kazakh “rapid reaction brigade” whose task, according to the Department of State, will be to “enhance Kazakhstan’s capability to respond to major terrorist threats to oil platforms or borders” [24].

The Department of Defense is also building up its capacity for direct military involvement in the region. The temporary base established at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan to support American combat in Afghanistan during the war against the Taliban is now being converted into a semi-permanent military installations, capable of supporting U.S. operations throughout Central Asia and the Caspian basin [25]. In addition, senior Pentagon officials have indicated that they are considering the acquisition of additional “forward operating bases” in Azerbaijan and Georgia to support future U.S. troop deployments in the region [26]. The airfield at Atyrau is also being eyed for this purpose: According to the Department of State, the base will house a facility to be used by U.S. and Kazakh troops for “joint training in the area of counter-terrorism” [27] – a possible first step toward its permanent occupation by American forces. A similar pattern of ever-expanding U.S. military involvement is also evident in West Africa. Underlying this effort is growing American reliance on African oil. West Africa is expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market, the Cheney report affirmed [28]. From Washington’s perspective, this imbues sub-Saharan Africa with a geopolitical significance it has never previously enjoyed. African oil is of national strategic interest to us, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner declared in 2002, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward [29].

Having been designated as a “national strategic interest” of the United States, African oil is being exposed to the same sort of military initiatives that have long been pursued in the Persian Gulf and are now being instituted in the Caspian Sea region. As in these other areas, the opening wedge of U.S. involvement in Africa is military assistance and training – an approach that facilitates the establishment of close ties with the region‘s (often dominant) military elites. The Department of Defense has sharply increased its aid to the two leading African oil producers, Angola and Nigeria, and further increases are likely in the future. Most of this aid is being funneled through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program, the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) surplus-arms giveaway, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, but additional assistance is provided through multilateral programs supposedly intended to bolster regional peacekeeping and counterinsurgency capabilities, such as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) [30].

To establish greater oversight of these programs and further instill the U.S. military presence in Africa, in 2007 President Bush the established the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) – the Pentagon’s first overseas regional command to be formed since CENTCOM was established by President Reagan in 1983. Previously, responsibility for U.S. military activities in Africa was divided between EURCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM, with none viewing Africa as a major concern; now, with the formation of AFRICOM, Africa has been elevated to a major strategic concern for the U.S. military [31]. And while senior officers are reluctant to admit that oil has played a role in this process, they are quick to acknowledge this when speaking off the record. Thus, when talking about the possible need for new bases in the region, a senior officer told a reporter from the Wall Street Journal, a key mission for U.S. forces [in Africa] would be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields, which in the future could account for as much as 25 percent of U.S. oil imports, are secure [32].

The Global Competition Over Energy

In all of these activities, the principal goal of U.S. foreign energy policy is to ensure access to as many foreign suppliers of oil as possible, to increase the participation of American companies in the development of these countries’ reserves, and to try to prevent any disruption in the delivery of petroleum from these suppliers to the United States.

In pursuit of these goals, American policymakers have come, over time, to rely increasingly on military means of one sort or another. These include, first of all, efforts to protect the regimes that govern the states that provide the United States with the bulk of its imported energy. This was the essence of the arrangement forged between President Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz in 1945, and underlies the military aid agreements that Washington has signed with so many petro-states ever since. Also included are measures to deter – or, if necessary, defeat – hostile nations that might attempt to sever the supply lines that extend from key supplier states to the United States. But now a new form of military activity is emerging: Measures to prevent China and Russia from gaining a dominant position in such key oil-producing areas as Africa and the Caspian Sea basin.

This new U.S. focus on China and Russia stems from anxieties that China – with a growing thirst for oil of its own – is increasingly competing with the United States for access to oil reserves in the global South, and that Russia seeks to dominate the transportation of energy from the Caspian Sea basin to international markets. In pursuing these objectives, Beijing and Moscow are forging ties of their own with governments in these areas and in some cases competing with Washington for the loyalty of key producers, such as Angola, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria. In doing so, moreover, they are following the established American pattern and providing arms and military assistance as a means of cementing ties with local military elites [33].

That top U.S. policymakers view these efforts as a potential threat to America’s vital energy interests is evident from a number of recent reports and Congressional hearings. Of particular note is The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, an annual report released by the U.S. Department of Defense at the behest of Congress. Securing adequate supplies of resources and materials has become a major driver of Chinese foreign policy, the 2006 edition affirmed. Not only are the Chinese providing arms and military technology to favored resource providers, the report claims, but they are also beginning to reconfigure their navy to ensure access to these distant suppliers. Evidence suggests that China is investing in maritime surface and sub-surface weapons systems that could serve as the basis for a force capable of power projection to secure vital sea lines of communication and/or key geostrategic terrain [34].

American concern over Russia’s efforts to dominate energy transportation in Eurasia have been aired in a number of Congressional hearings, including a series on U.S. Energy Security convened by Senator Chuck Hagel of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom cut off the flow of gas to Ukraine on January 1, 2006 – supposedly in a dispute over prices, but widely viewed as retaliation for the Ukrainian government’s pro-Western tilt – the Bush administration lashed out at Moscow, condemning any such use of energy assets for political advantage. No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation, Vice President Cheney declared at a pro-democracy conference in Vilnius, Latvia on May 4, 2006 [35].

In response to these challenges, the Department of Defense has stepped up its diplomatic and military endeavors in Africa and the Caspian basin, always seeking to advance U.S. interests while countering inroads by China and Russia. After delivering his critical remarks in Vilnius, for example, Vice President Cheney traveled to Kazakhstan, where he sought to persuade President Nursultan Nazarbayev to ship future Kazakh oil exports via the U.S.-backed BTC pipeline rather than through conduits that traverse Russia [36]. Cheney (along with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) has also worked hard to bolster U.S. ties with the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan in the face of strong pressure by Beijing and Moscow to dilute America’s influence in these countries.

Turning to Africa, the recent establishment of AFRICOM can be viewed in part as a response to the growing presence of China in the region. Although U.S. military officials regularly deny, in public, that this move has anything to do with China’s aggressive pursuit of African oil reserves, they are not so reticent in private. When speaking off the record, they are often quite prepared to acknowledge that the Department of Defense is concerned about China’s “rising influence” in Africa [37]. Indeed, the fact that the formation of Africom was announced on February 7, 2007 – the very day that Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived in Africa for a much-publicized eight-nation tour of the continent – was not lost on commentators in the region [38]. Stepped-up U.S. military aid to Angola, Nigeria, and other major African oil suppliers should also be seen in this light.

It is still too early to interpret these moves as a full-scale resource struggle, similar to the inter-imperial contests that foreshadowed World War I, but they certainly are moving in that direction. The United States, for its part, is building up its naval capabilities in waters off Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and bolstering its military ties with such long-term allies as Japan and Saudi Arabia. China and Russia are also strengthening their military capabilities and have established a strategic partnership, entailing ever-increasing energy and military cooperation; both, moreover, are co-sponsors of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional security organization in Central Asia that also incorporates Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Competition for oil and natural gas is rarely cited by these countries’ top officials as the principal motive for these initiatives, but it is widely viewed by informed observers as a primary factor [39].

And so we have entered an era in which the global competition for energy is becoming increasingly fierce, in which the largest untapped supplies of oil are located in areas of chronic instability, and in which the major consuming powers are increasingly coming to rely on military measures to ensure access to key sources of supply. Nor only is this leading to direct military involvement by the major powers in the internal affairs of key oil-producing states, as shown by American involvement in Iraq, but also to military competition amongst the great powers themselves for geopolitical advantage in the principal oil-producing areas. Where all this will lead is hard to predict, but if history is any judge, the outcome will not be pleasant.